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Reviewed by Blake T. Ostler

Bridging the Gulf
Robinson is a Mormon. Blomberg is an evangelical. Amazingly, they carry on a conversation worthy of being called "C hri stian " regarding the concern s and agreements they have with one
another. They have jointl y authored an important book that is a
model of informed d iscussion abou t issues affecting both Mormons and evangelicals. My hat is off, especially to Blomberg. who
no doubt ri sked hi s standing among some in his evangelical community 10 carryon the type of di scussion- seeking-understand ing
and rapprochement that is the hallmark of How Wide the Divide?
I thank him for hi s courage and good will. Throu gh this review, I
would like to enter the conversation with them both , if that is not
too presu mptuous.
Judgi ng from evange lical respo nses on the Internet and the refusal of several fundam entalist Chri st ian bookstores to carry How
Wide the Divide? one would think that Stephen Robinson ate
Blomberg's proverbial lunch, creamed him, got away with several
low punches, and basicall y wiped him out without giving him a
fair chance to make a statement. In reality, Blomberg is a very
able spokesman for evangelicals. Apparently so me so-called
Ch ri stians are upset at the mere prospect of giving a Mormon a
chance to actually declare hi s beliefs without their first being defined by the anti-Mormon publi shi ng houses.
Robinson is also a fair-minded and informed representative of
his Mormon faith . He makes several intelligent choices about defining and dealing with "w hat is Mormon doctrine" in his essays
that I believe are essential to any productive conversation among
Mormons and evange licals. Robinson adopts a personal voice and
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discusses his personal beliefs. as opposed to defin ed. "o ffi cial"
Mormon beliefs. This approac h is essentia l to disc uss io ns of
Latter-day Saint doctrines for a very simple reason: An o ffi cial
c reedal statement of Mormon doctrine does not exist, and a broad
diversity of possible views abounds within Mormonism. The common assumption-which Robinson correci ly rejects-th at Lauerday Saints are somehow bo und to believe everything ever said by
any church authority at any time simpl y does not fe ncet what in div idual Mormons aClually believe or shou ld believe. Moreover,
acceptance of such an assumption would lead to a wildly inco he rent belief syslcm. Robinson wise ly sees Ihat trying to define
"Mormon doctrine" as a basis for di scuss ion could only lead 10
endless debate about what constitutes doctrine somehow binding
on Latter-day Saints.

Sola Scriptura
Robinson's presentation is strik ingly refreshing and open regarding the fac t that not all Latter-day Saint beliefs can be found
in the Bible and that Mormons shoul d therefore stop read ing
Mormon beliefs into the Bible as proof texts. Thus Robinson qu ite
properly acknow ledges that the doctrine of the Father's having a
material body cannot be found in the Bible t and that the doct rine
of three degrees of glory is not clearly e nough defin ed to su ppo rt
the Latter-day Saint belief without further clarification thro ugh
modern revelation (see pp. 89, 150- 5 1). However, Robinson insists that none of hi s Mormon beliefs contradict the Bible, as
opposed to simpl y not being asserted therein. Robinson ad opts a
version of sola scriplura-on ly doctrines presented in works accepted as scripture are bind ing on Latte r-day Saints. He makes an
exception for the doctrine-found nowhere in scripture- that
God (the Father) was o nce as man and that there was a time before
the Father became God. Hi s rat ionale ror this exception is that
Mormons have believed th is doctrine for so long and it is so well
However, it has recently been argue<! that the referenee in Philippians
2:6to the "form of God" may very well refer to the visual image of the glorified
body of God. See Markus Bockmuchl. "'"The Form of God' (Phil. 2:6): Va ri ations
on a lllemc of Jewish Mystici sm,"' Journal of Theological Siudies 4811 (April
1997) : 1-23.
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en trenched that it must be accepted as an offi cial Mormon belief
(see p. 87).
My on ly reservation about Robinson's modified dogma of
sola scriptura is that it is hard to square with his view that the ulti mate authority in the Latter-day Saint commu nit y resides in living
prophets, for he has no princip led basis for rejecting the sermons
of dead prophets in the Journal of Discourses as opposed to sermons of the li ving prophet, which he accepts as the ultimate guarantee of accurate interpretation of scriptu re (see pp. 58-59). The
not ion that a prophet's words and scriptural interpretat ions are
true onl y so long as he is alive is dubious at best and clearly false
at worst. Two possible solutions to th is dilemma are apparent. One
could limi t the binding sources to those te)(ts and callin gs upheld
by common consen t at a confere nce of Saints. Thus the scriptures
are binding because they have been accepted by the communi ty
throug h a procedurall y proper vote. The sermons and interpretati ons of li ving prophets and apostles arc accepted as binding because they have been sustained by the vote of the people. This
approach, however, seems to place form over substance and does
liule 10 resolve the tension. One would still be bound to support,
for example, the Adam-God doctrine if taught by Brigham Young
while president but no longer bound to bel ieve that doctrine after
his death. Suc h a changing view of truth would be acceptable to
very few Mormons and even fewer evangelicals.
Another way to resolve this di lemma would be to recognize a
continuum of sources, some more and some less authoritative, as a
source of Mormon beliefs. For e)(ample, only the scriptures are
bind ing and must be accepted in all that they say. However, oth er
sou rces 10 which Mormons can look to assist them in inte rpreting
the scriptures would include (in order of descendi ng auth ority)
uncanonized revelations given to Joseph Smith or other prophets,
statements by Joseph Smith , offic ial stalements by the First Presidency. the Lectures on Faith, statements of li ving prophets and
apostles, and the statements of past prophets and apostles. Accepting a continuum of sources and recognizing that some are
more authoritative as sources of Latter-day Saint doctrine than
others resolves the dilemma and seems to give due weight to various sources. Moreover. I bel ieve that this approach appro)(imates,
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my (qu ite possibly fallible) experience, how most Latter-day

Saints in fact weigh what they should believe.

Robinson also wisely asserts that he is the world's authority on
his own beliefs. By labeling and expounding hi s own convictions,
Robinson sidesteps issues regarding the possible range of sometimes divergent and ill-defined beliefs that Mormons can and do
accept. It seems to me that Robinson is able to provide a co herent
expression of his beliefs as a Lauer-day Saint because he can discount or ignore certain trajectories of (nonscriptural) doctrines
that have been asserted by past c hurch authorities, such as the
Adam-God doctrine, blood atonement, and views of progression
of God the Father fr om a merely mortal status to godhood. I will
discuss some of these beliefs in greater detail later. Here I merely
want to point out that a val uable discussion occurs in How Wide
the Divide? because Robinson does not waste time trying to prove
that what he believes reall y is or should be Mormon doctrine.
In contrast, Blomberg rarely shares his personal views. With
the excepti on of hi s commitment to scriptural inerrancy. Blomberg expounds the range of belief systems that have historically
been adopted by evangelicals. Blomberg's choice is also a wise
one, given the background assumptions that many evangelicals
make regarding evangel ical be liefs. The Calvinists and biblical
conservatives have so completely controlled evange lical seminaries
that it seems evangel icals are all Calvinists. While Bl omberg adm it s
that he has Calvini st leanings, he admits Arminian views within the
evangelical fold as well. Indeed, he is willing to acknowledge the
valuable contributions of those evangelicals who have rejected the
classical formulations of God, includin g beliefs that God is me taphysically si mple, impassible, immutable in all respects, or timeless. Blomberg even suggests that it is permissible for an evangeli cal to believe that God may not have foreknowledge of future
contin gents (see p. 109).2 Notwithstanding his assertion that
2
David BaSinger argues that it is permissible for an evange lical to believe that God does not know future contingents in The Case for Freewill Theism:
A Philosophical Assessmenl (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1996). 49-52,
and ''Can an Evangelical Christian Justifiably Deny God's Exhaustive Knowledge of the Future?" Christian Scholars Review 25n (1995): 133-45. Francis
Beckwith argues that an evangelical cannot deny God's foreknow ledge of future
contingents in "Limited Omniscience and the Test for a Prophet: A Brief Phi -
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evangelica ls rely solely on the Bible for their beliefs and see
creeds as apt summaries of biblical propositions, he wisely allows a
range of evangelical beliefs that are consistent with the historic
creeds. Blomberg more than hold s hi s own in this civil discussion.
Apparentl y Blomberg cons iders acceptance of biblical in·
errancy as essential to being an evangelical. He ignores the neo·
orthodox view of scripture as a witness to God's primary revela·
tion in Christ. This view recognizes human mistakes and misun·
derstanding because scriptures are written by fallible humans from
their perspecti ve rather than God's. For the neoorthodox, [he
scripture is God's word insofar as it functions as a witness and
locus of encountering Christ, rather than as an object to which one
is committed. Blomberg does not contemplate the possibility that
evangelicals could hold such a view and remain within the evan·
gelical fold. However, I think that Blomberg's commitment to
biblical inerrancy, espec ially as defined by the Chicago Statement
on Biblical Inerrancy, ought not be accepted. Now down to the
details.

Blomberg on Inerrancy
BOIh Blomberg and Robinson fall all over themselves to fe·
assure us that they believe every word contained in the Bible.
losophical Analysis," Journal of Ihe Evangelical Theological SocielY 3613
(1993): 357-62. By my lights. Basinger convincingly shows that Beekwith's
arguments are unsound and not well considered. Norman Geisler argues that
evangelicals must accept not only that God foreknows all future free acts. but
also the Thomistic doctrine that "God causes all things by his knowledge." Cre·
aling God in Ihe Image of Man? (Mi nnea polis: Bethany House, 1997), 37. For
the insuperable problems of such a Thomistic determinism, see the responses to
Geisler by fe llow evangelicals John Feinberg. Bruce Reichenbach. and Clark
Pinnock, in Predes/inalion and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and
Human Freedom, ed. David Basinger and Randall Basinger (Downers Grove, III. :
InterVarsity. 1986). 85- 98. If Geisler's response is the best that Calvinistl
Thomist evangelicals can manage in response to those who promote the "open
view of God," then the Calvinists appear to me to be in real trouble. John Sanders also responds to Beckwith's argument and shows that simple foreknowledge
affords God no more providential control (induding prophecy) than the notion
of God's all inclusive "present knowledge." John Sanders, "Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God."
,.·airh and Philosophy 14/1 (1997): 26-40.
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Bl omberg uses the Bible to define the bo unds of C hristian be lie f
while Rob in son uses the Bible 10 show that Lauer-day Saints fall
wi thin the bounds of C hristianity. Blomberg insists that a ll his beliefs are biblical, thus proposing a version of the doctrine of sola
scriprura that has been the main stay of conservati ve Proteslanl
thought since the Reformatio n.
Both Bl omberg and. surprising ly, Ro binson "agree th at th e
presen t biblical tex t is the word of God within the comm o n
para meters of th e Chicago Statement and the e ighth Article of
Fa ith " (p.75). Blomberg gives a succinct summary of what he
believes the Chicago Statement on B iblical Inerrancy a mounts to :
Ine rrancy means that when all facts are known, the
Scriptures in the ir o ri ginal autograph s and prope rl y
inte rpreted will be shown to be wholly true in everything that they affirm , whether that has to do w ith doctrine or mo rali ty or with the social, ph ysical o r li fe
sc iences. (p. 35)

The doctrin e of inerrancy jJ internally incoherent. In m y
opinion, nu merous in superabl e proble ms dictate the rejection
of inerrancy in general and inerrancy as promulgated in the Chi cago State ment in partic ular. First. the Chicago State ment is se lfreferentiall y incohe rent. One cannot consistently assert that the
Bible is the basis of hi s or her beliefs and then assert that one mu st
neverthe less accept biblical ine rrancy as asserted in the Ch icago
State ment (as Blomberg and othe r evangelical s do). This state ment
contains a number of assertions, propositio ns if you will. th at are
not bi blical. Inerrancy, at least as recentl y asserted by evangelicals,
is not spelled out in the Bible. Nowhere do the wo rds inerrant o r
infallible appear in the Bible. S uch theoretical views are quite alien
to the biblical writers. Further, inerrancy is not included in any of
the major creeds. Suc h a nolion is of rathe r recent vint age a nd
rather peculiar to American evangelicalism. Throug hout the history of Christ ia n thought. the Bible has been a source rathe r than
an object of beliefs. The assertion that the Bible is inerrant goes
we ll beyond the scriptural statements that all sc ripture3 is inspired
3
It is also problematic 10 assert that these statements abou t the " inspired" nature of "all" scripture refer to the New Testament. for neither the Ncw
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or "God-breathed." Thus inerrancy, as a faith commitment, is
inconsistent with the assertion that one's beliefs are based on what
the Bible says. The doctrine of inerrancy is an extrabiblical doctrine about the Bible based on nonscriptural considerations. It
should be accepted only if it is reasonable and if it squares with
what we know from scripture itself, and not as an article of faith as
Blomberg presents it. However, it is nOl and it does not.
The Chicago Statement can funclion only as a statement of
belief and not as a reasonable observation of what we find in the
Bible. The Chicago Statement itself acknowledges that we do not
find inerrant statements in the Bible, for it is only "when all facts
are known" that we will see that inerrancy is true. It is very co nvenient to propose a theory that cannot be assessed unless and until we are in fact omniscient. That is why the Chicago Statement is
a use less proposition. It cannot be a statement of faith derived
from the Bible because it is not in the Bible. It cannot be a statement about what the evidence shows because the evidence cannot
be assessed until we are omniscient. What is left except a pioussounding noise?
The docrrine of inerrancy is utltenable. Second, the Chicago
Statement on Inerrancy is incoherent because it attempts to assert
simultaneously that "the written Word jn its erlfirety is revelation
given by God," yet that we can somehow ignore obvious contradictions and prescie ntific assumptions contained in the Bible that
are clearly wrong because, somehow, such views are not affirmed
by the scripture. 4 This convenient exception to inerrancy, i.e., that
the Bible is inerrant only in what it affirms, contradicts not only
the notion of plenary in spiration asserted in the Chicago Statement, but also seriously begs the question. For example, the
Genesis creat ion story views the world as a three-tiered reality,
with the great waters held above the vau lt of the earth. which was
Testament nor many works contained therein existed at the lime the writer of
2 Timothy asserted that "'all scripture is given by inspiration of God [Greek
"'God breathed"'] and is profitable for doctrine'" (2 Timothy 3:16). The author no
doubt referred to the Old Testament. as Blomberg himself acknowledges (see
p. 34).
4
The Chicago Statement on Inerrancy can be fou nd in Norman L. Geisler
and William E. Nix. A Genera/Introduction 10 the Bible, rev. and expo (Chicago:
Moody Press, 1986), 181-85, emphasis added. I quote from Article 3 here.
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broken at the time of creation. The earth is a flat disc totally su rro unded by waters . It is situ ated over Sheal at Ihe center of the
earth . While it is an easy rationalization 10 argue. as Blomberg
does (see p. 36), that this view of the world is merely assumed and
not asserted, such an explanation cannot be squared with the bibli cal assertions about how Ihe crcal ion proceeded in the o pe ning
chapter of Genes is. for God creates by defeating chaos and unleashing the waters above the great vault. S Further. the book of
Joshua makes it fairly clear that the sun stood still (see Joshua
10:12-13). For those of us li ving in a post-Copernican world. the
sun does not go around the earth as Joshua presupposes. It is un derstandab le that intelligent persons such as Blomberg cannot in
integrity affirm all that the Bible does, given its prescientific assumptions. but it is not understandab le that persons have religious
devotion to a nonbiblical doctrine of inerra ncy that can not in integrity be reconciled with the facts.
In errancy igllores the biblical evidence of human errors alld
disagreements. Third, the Chicago Statement simply can not be
reconciled with the facts presented by the biblical documents
themselves. The Chicago Statement asserts that scripture is wit hout
error or fault in all of its teaching and that inspiration "g uaranteed true and trustworthy utterance on all matte rs of which the
Biblical authors were moved to speak or write" (Article 9),6 Yel
this faith is misplaced and subject to being seriously eroded by
even a facile reading of the bibl ical text. To give onl y a few examples: Acts 9:7 narrates that the companions who accompanied
Paul on the road to Damascus heard a voice but did not see a
form of man ; whereas Acts 22:9 tells us that Paul 's companions
did not hear any voice but saw a light. One of these scriptural affirmati ons. both of which are attested in all the earliest manu -

5
Sec the discussion in E. A. Speiser, The Anchor Bible Genesis (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1964), 12-13; John Day, God's Conflict with the
Dragon and the S£o: Echoes oj a Canaanite Myth in fhe Old Tes/oment (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity, 1985); Hermann Gunkel, SchiJpjung und Cham in
Urzeit WId Endz.ei/ (G6ttingen: V:mdenhocek and Ruprecht, 1895); and Richard J.
Clifford, '1lle Hebrew Scriptures and the Theology of Creation," Theological
Studies 46 (1985): 507-12.
6
Geisler and Nix, General lntroductjon to the Bible, 182-83 .
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scri pts, is surely erroneous and thus fallible. Either Paul's companions heard the voice or they did not.
Matthew uses a Greek translation of Isaiah as the basis for a
prophecy that a "virg in " shall conceive and bear a c hild (Matthew 1:23; compare Isaiah 7: 14). The Greek word translated from
Isaiah is parrhenos, which clearly means "v irgin ." The Greek
translates the Hebrew word 'almii' used in the Hebrew text of
Isaiah . However, the Hebrew 'alnuj' means a young woman, without any necessary connotation of virginity. The Hebrew word for
virgjn is baruliih. The author of the Gospel of Matthew relied on a
mistaken understanding of Isaiah arising from mistranslation. To
rationalize that the Matthean text does not affirm that Christ wac;
born of a virg in simply will nOl work-that is the very purpose of
using Isaiah to prophesy of Jesus' virgin birth. Moreover, it is inconceivable that the "origina l autographs" read differently because the enti re sc riptural argument in Matthew rests on the mistaken translation. Scriptural inerrancy is si mpl y not tenable in
light of these types of problems. which could be multiplied many
times over.
The Ch icago Statement professes "the unity and internal consistency of the Scripture" (Article 14).7 Even Robinson accepts a
harmonizing hermeneutic that forces scriptural unity and harmony by assuming it (see p. 70). This assumption of harmon y
among all writers ignores the various, somet imes conflicting, views
presented in the scripture . For example, I Samuel 8 presents the
Israe lite acceptance of the monarchy as a rejection of Yahweh:
"And the Lord said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voice of the
people in all that they say unto thee: for they have not rejected
thee, but have rejected me. that I should not re ig n over them"
( I Samuel 8:7). However, the promonarchy message of I Samuel
12 presents the establishment of a monarchy as Yahweh's own act:
"Now therefore behold the king whom you have chosen, and
whom ye have desired! and. behold. the Lord hath set a king over
you" (I Samuel 12: 13). It appears that there were opposi ng political views in ancient Israel regarding the monarchy. Attempts to
harmonize these two views, as if the monarchy is both a rejection

7

tbid .. 184.
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of Yahweh and also divinely instituted by Yahweh, overlooks the
complex ity of the scripture and the reality of opposing views.8
Further, the diverse development of the say ings of Jesus in the
early Christian churc h wipes oul any assumption that the scriplUres const itute a harmonious whole. For example. Mark and Luke
(probably in reliance on Mark) both teach that divorce is prohibited.9 However, Matthew twice adds an exception to this absolute
prohibition against divorce and remarriage: " I tell you, whoever
divorces hi s wife. except for unchastity, and marries someone else,
commits adultery" (Mati hew 19:9, Albright and Mann, trans., The
Anchor Bible Matthew, 225; compare Malthew 5:31 - 32). Paul
goes further and prohibits divorce unless a believer is married to
a nonbeliever who wants a divorce (see I Corinthians 7: 10-15).
This disunity among the writers of the Bible has led, not sur~
prisingly, to various views regard ing divorce. Catholics prohibit
divorce absolutely, following Mark and Luke . The Orthodox, fol~
lowing Matlhew, permit divorce only in the case of adultery .
Protestants and Latter-day Saints allow divorce in a wide range of
instances. Further, commentators agree that within the original
context of the question put to Jesus about whether divorce is allowed by the Law (Torah), the Pharisees were asking Jesus whether
he followed the Jewish teacher Shammai, who prohibited a man to
divorce except in cases of adultery, o r Hille l, who permitted a man
to divorce in the case of a wife's shameful or disgraceful acts.
(Jewish law did not allow a wife to divorce her husband. co ntrary
to Mark and Luke). Matthew has Jesus side with Shammai, while
Mark and Luke have Jesus reject all Jewish interpretations of the
Law in favor of an absolute prohibition of divorce. JO In any
event, a clear divergence in opinions raises quest ions about what
8
Sec the discussion in John Bright. A History of Israel ( Philadelph ia:
Westminster. 1981). IR7-90: and J. A. Soggin. "Charisma und Institution im
Konigtum Sauls:' Zeilschrift fiir die ailles/amentlic/re Wissenschafl 75 (1963):
:'14-65.
9
The statements in Mark 10:11-12 and Luke 16:18 are ncarly identical:
"And (Jesus] saith unto the m: WhoSQCver shall put aWilY his wife. and marry another. eommillcth adultery against her. And if a woman shall pUi away her hus·
band. and be married 10 another. she committelh adultery:'
10 See W. F. Albright and C. S. Mann. The Anclror Bible Mal/Ire ..... (Garden
City, N.Y.: Doubleday. [971).65 and 225; C. S. M:rnn. Tire Anchor Bible Mark
(Garden City, N.Y.: [)Qubleday. 1986).386-89.
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conditions. if any. justified divorce. Any attempt to force a harm oni zing hermeneutic again simply misunderstands and misrepresents the diversity among the biblica l authors. These problems
hardly touch the tip of the proverbial iceberg.
Finally, Blomberg is sim pl y wrong when he asserts that" n 0
Evangel ical (or fo r that matter no Protestant) doctrine depends on
any textually disputed verse" (p. 35). Blomberg is well aware that
the earliest manuscripts of Mark 16 end at verse 8. just after the
announcement of the empty tomb and without mentioning any
resurrection appearances. Based in part on this textual dispute.
sc holars debate whether the "empty tomb" tradition ex isted prior
to or indepe ndentl y of resurrection-appearance texts. I I I would
have thought that the fact and nature of the resurrection were important doctrines. Further, the sole support for the two-nature
theory of Chri stology is a disputed reading of the Gospel of John
3:13 (which doesn't support the theory anyway).12
These problems are not created by biblical scholars, many
of whom have a deep love for both the Bible and Christ ianity.
Rather. the problems are suggested by the very doublets and multiple versions of the same events and sayings attested in the Bible
itse lf. For example, the differences between the birth stories in
both Matthew and Luke suggest two irreconcilable traditions
of Jesus' birth.13 One could hardly accuse Raymond Brown. a
I I See Sleven T. Davis, Risen Indeed: Making Sense o/Ille Resurrection
(Grand Rapids, Mich. : Eerdmans. 1993), 62- 84: and Leonhard Goppelt. Theol·
ogy 0/ Iile New Teslamenl, trans. John E. Alsup, cd. Jiirgen Roloff (Grand
Rapids. Mieh, : Eerdmans, 1981).
12 John 3:13 says: "And no man hath ascended up to heaven. but he that
came down from heaven. even the Son of man which is in heaven" (emphasis
added). Some use John 3: 13 as a proof text to show that whi le Jesus was on earth.
the Son of Man was simultaneously in heaven, based on the present tense of the
verb in this text. However, it is precisely the tense of the verb on which many of
the earliest manuscripts disagree. For the variant textual readings see Augustinus
Merk, S. J .. Novum Teslamenlum Groece el w/ine (Rome: Pontifical Biblical
Institute, 1963). 314.
13 As the foremost authority on the birth narratives. Raymond Brown.
Biblical Exegesis and Church DOClrine (New Yor": Paulist. 1985), 68. explains:
The two birth stories do not agree with each other. Matthew would
lead the reader to assume that Joseph and Mary lived at Bethlehem
where they had a house ([Matthew) 2: t l). for he takes great pains to
explain why they left Bethlehem to go to settle in Nazareth (JMauhew]
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Catholic who has a greater stake in the status of Mary a nd the virg in birth than either Latter-day Sai nts or evangelicals. o f simpl y

creating these proble ms out of naturali stic assumpti ons. The problems arise from the lext and not from naturalistic assumptions.
Inerrancy is inconsistent with libertarian free will. Fourth, in e rrancy is also inconsistenr with the notion of mora lly signific3m
free will asserted by Mormons and Arminians. One of the primary
reasons many have given for rejecting ine rrancy is that it am ounts
to a theory of divi ne dictat ion. an obliteration of the human pe rsonality and contributi on to the scriptures. In response, all eva ngelical writings 1 a m acquainted with deny that their views o n
scriptural inerrancy amount to a doctri ne of di vine dictation, as if
the sc ripture were simpl y words recorded as God spoke. Blombe rg
is no exception: "No reputable Evangel ical sc holar or theolog ian
be lieves in di vine dictation for more than a tiny fraction of Sc ri pture (e.g., the Te n Commandments)" (p.37). Yet the issue is not
whether evangelicals claim not to accept di vine dictation, but
whether their view logically entails a dictation theory, whether th ey
acknow ledge it or not. It is my position that the Chicago Stateme nt implicitly assumes a Calvinistic dete rminism a nd is incompatible with morally Signific ant free will despite such disclaimers.
The C hicago Statement seems to assert two mutually excl usive
sources of scriptural texts. On the one hand, it asserts that all tire
words are controlled by God and therefore must be infall ible and
inerrant :

Holy Scripture, being God',.' own Word, written b y
men prepared and superinte nded by Hi s Spi rit. is of in fallible divine authority in all matters upon which it
2:22-23), His account leaves no logical space for a census that broug ht
them te mporarily to Bethlehem from Nm:arcth. such as Luke describes.
Luke reporls nothing about magi, a star, and the n ight to Egypt: nor
docs his accoUn! of a peaceful return to Nazareth through Je rusalem
leave room fo r such events. These discrepancies make it extremely
dubious that both accou nts cou ld have come from a family source or
that botlr accounts are historical. The contention that Luke's account al
least is historical runs up against the non-verifiability of the census
and Ihe fact that Luke describes inaccurately the process 01 purifl·
cation/presentation (despite forced attempts to explain away 'their
purification' in Luke 2:22-only Mary needed purification).
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touches .... Being wholly and verbally God-given,
Scripture is without error or fault in all of its teachings .
. .. We affirm that the written Word in its entirety is
revelati on of God. . .. We affirm that the whole o f
scripture and all of its parts, down to the very words of
fhe originaL. were given by divine [i.e., infallibl eJ revelation .... We affirm that in spiration ... gua ranteed
true and trustworthy utterances in all matters of which
the Biblical authors were moved to speak and write.
On the other hand, the position of the Chicago Statement IS
that even though all the words are wholly God-given the hum an
authors are nevertheless responsible for the human limitations evidenced in the biblical scriptures:
We affirm that God ... has used [human] language
as a means of reve lation . We deny that human language
is so limited by our creaturel iness that it is rendered
inadequate as a vehicle for divine [i .e., infallible] revelati on.... We affirm that God's revelation ... lis1
progressive .. . . We affi rm that God ... utilized the
dist inctive personalities and literary styles of the writers
whom He had chosen and prepared. We deny that God,
in causing these writers to use fhe very words that He
chose, overrode their personalities. 14
But how can God cause human s to use the words that he chooses
and guarantee that these words are infallible unless he overri des
thei r freedom to use the words they would choose? If the words of
sc ripture refl ect human interpretation, human personalities, historica l horizons from the human perspective, then the words are at
least in part reflecti ve of human limitations and errors.
The crux of the matter is the different notion of free will with
which most evange licals (many explicitl y and most implicitly) operate. As David and Randall Basinger have pointed oul, the inerranti st's argument, when full y fl es hed out, is as follow s:

14 All quotations from Geisler and Nix. General ImrotiUlion 10 Ihe Bible.
182. emphasis added.
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1. "The words of Ihe Bible are the product of free human
ac tivity. "
2. "Human act ivities (such as pen nin g a book) can be tota lly
controlled by God without violat ing human freedom."
3. "God totally controlled what human authors did in fact
write."
4 . "The refore, the words of the Bibl e are God's utte rances."
5. "Whate ver God utters is e rrorless (inerrant),"
6. "Therefore, the words of the Bible are errorless (ine rr ant)."15

15 Randall Basinger and David Basinger, "Inerrancy, Dictation. and the
Free Will Defence," The Evangelical Quarterly 55/3 ( 1983): 177-80. For Norman L. Geisler's response. see "Inerrancy and Free Will: A Reply to the Brothe rs
Basinger," El'{lngelicai Quarterly 57/4 (1 985): 347-53. See also the Basingers'
reply in "Inerrancy and Free Will: Some Further Thoughts," The Evangelical
Quarterly 58/4 (1 986): 351-54. Geisler, Crea/illg God ill the Image of Man?
131. now admits that the brothers Basinger were essentially correct and that
only those who espouse the Calvinist view of soft determinism can square their
belief wilh scriptu ral inerrancy. 11 follows that those who believe in scriptural
inerrancy cannot rely on the frec-will dcfense to the problem of evil: rat her, they
must assert that a ll evi ls are merely apparent and that each instance of evil or
pain is really ultimately good because it serves as a necessary means to the existence of a greater gOod-a position that strikes me as implausible in extremis.
For a devastati ng critique of this type of theodicy, see Terence Pene lhum,
"Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil." in The Problem of Evil, cd. Marilyn
McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams (New York: Oxford University Press .
1990), 69- 82: and Michael Martin, A/heism: A Philosophical Justifica/ion
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 334-61. John Feinberg also
admits: "We must accept eithc r a dictation theory, which says God dictated exactly what the writers wrote, or a theory of inspiration consistent with eompatibilism, which allows both God and the writer to be active in the process so as to
guarantee thai what God wanted was written.
IT]hc onl y way to hold to
verbal plenary inspiration as set forth in 2 Peter 1:21 seems to be to hold compatibilism ILe., that causal determinism is compatible with free will ]."' Feinberg, ''Cod Ordains All Things:' in Predestination and Free Will , 35. Fe in berg
asserts that 2 Peter 1:21 requires his view of plenary verbal inspiration because
it should be translated: "Men spokc from God as thcy were carried 1I/01lg IGrcek
pheromelloi] by the Holy Spirit"" (emphasis added). lie asscrts that pheromelloi
must be understood in the sense of "bei ng taken up by the bearer and brought to
his IGod's) goal" rathcr than '"mo ved upon by thc Holy Ghost,'" as thc KJV translates it. Ibid" emphasiS added. However, Thayer suggcsts that the morc app ropriate translation in this contellt is " (0 be moved inwardly. promptcd," suggesting persuasion rather than coercion. Joseph 1-1 . Thayer, 11 Greek -Ellglish Lexicon
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The question boils down to whether premise (2) can be coherently a""serted, which depends on the notion of free will one
adopts. If one adopts the Arminian notion of contracausai
agency-also known as libertarian free will-as the ability to do
otherwise given all conditi ons obtainin g in the moment of free
decision , then (2) Clmn nt he cnherentl y asserted. God cannot both
cause or determine humans to write the words of scripture and
also leave humans free to choose words other than those God
causes or determines. That is, the human author can not do ot herwise in relation to God and thus is nOI free in the relevant sense. If
a person is free in this sense, then the words he writes are chose n
by him, originating with that person and not full y determined by
causes outside his control. Given inerrancy. the words are not chosen by human writers, but by God. If there were an error in scripture, who would be responsible for the error, given that God has
chosen the very words used? It seems clear to me that God is responsible, and not the humans who had no co ntrol over the words
used in the scripture. That is why the logic of inerrancy entails
that there cannot be any errors-God is the source of all the words
in scripture, God is infallible; therefore the words of the Bible
must also be infallible. 16
We now see why inerrancy is adopted by evangelicals despite
the fact that it neither is found in the Bible nor can be reconciled
with what is found in the Bible. It is a necessary coro llary of th e
Calvinist theology of complete divine determinism. Without th e
assumption that God completely controls every word of scripture- indeed everything that happens-there simpl y is no reason
to accept inerrancy.
The inerranlist thu s assumes either the Calvinist view of sofl
determinism or adopts Martin Luther's acceptance of hard determinism and reject ion of free will altogether. The Calvinist view
assumes that humans can be free ahhough they are caused to
oj/ize New Tes/amerJI (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondcrvan. 1979), 650. Feinberg's
argumcnt suggests that God coercively carries the inspired writer away ra ther
than persuasively prompting.
[6 This is the very argument used to support inerrancy in Geisler and Nix.,
Gellerallntroduction to the Bible. 53. A similar position is suggested by 1. I.
Packer. ' Fllm/amelllalisln' and Ihe Word oj Grxl (rcprint, Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Ecrdmans, 1992). 80.
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think and do as they do: a person is free so long as he can do as
he wants, though what he wants is not up to him. Thus if God
causes a biblical author to want to write the words that God
chooses, that author is free to do as he wants. although his wants
and actions are not his own. However, if a person's wants and
desires are not up to him. if Ihe desire to write the spec ific words
chosen by God originates with God and is ultimately "guara nteed" by God, Ihen how is that person's personality still present in
writing the words? Why do the words c hosen by God exhibit the
limitations of the words the person would choose jf they orig inated with God rather than with him? It is incoherent to assert that
biblical scripture reflects the human cultures and limitations of its
human authors but the words are chosen by God, who is free of
such limitations. Once again, given scriptural inerrancy, God, and
not the human author, is ultimately responsible for the words of
scripture. Thus any limitation or errors evidenced in sc ripture
must be laid at God's feet as the ultimate cause of these words.
The problem of inerrancy is thus parallel to the problem of ev il.
Given the Calvinist com mitmen t to complete divine determinism.
any ev ils or errors thal occur are actually caused by God amJ he is
therefore responsible for them. But then any scriptu ral error, even
the slightest mistake, is sufficient evidence to show that ine rrancy
is false, since God cannot be in error or mistaken. Because I
believe that it is manifest that human limitations. mistakes, and
errors are present in scripture, it is easy to conclude that inerrancy
is an erroneous human view.

Mormonism and Inerrancy
It was unclear to me, even after reading his contribution sev·
eral times, whether Robinson fully adopted the Chicago Statement
on Biblical Inerrancy. My confusion arose from the fact that wh ile
repeatedly allowing for the possibility of errors in the written versions of Mormon scripture. Robinson nevertheless affirms that
Latter-day Saints can accept the Chicago Statement:

The orig inal revelation [of Mormon scripture] under·
stood in its original context might have been lOerrant" as given to the original apostles or prophets.
Therefore, Lauer-day Saints would agree with the five
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qualifications of the "C hi cago Statement on Biblical
Inerrancy," although, as usual, we would probably use
differenl terms to express the same ideas, (pp. 56--57)
I was confused as to whether Robinson allowed only sc ribal errors
or whether he allowed for human errors also in the orig inal revelation. 1 finally concluded that he holds that the original revelati on
is inerrant, though any attempt to put revelation into human language suffers from human limitations as provided in the Chicago
Statement. 17
I was stunned that Robinson apparently accepted the Chicago
Statement on Biblical Inerrancy as consistent wit h hi s Latter-day
Saint beliefs, especially after he went to such great lengths to ex plain that he as a Mormon believes that scripture "is in our (M ormons'} view recorded by men who can and do make mi stakes"
(p.57). Moreover, he points out that views assened in scripture
can be mistaken because "the speci fi cs of language. style and vocabulary are conditioned by the capacities, education , cultural
context, time and place of the inspired writer to whom God
speaks" (p. 57). While I totally agree with these statements, it is
clear that Robi nson cannot consistentl y assert that scriptures contain mistakes due to human limitations but that these same scriptures are "inerrant in all that they assen" as the Chicago Statement declares, nor that although the very words of scripture are
chosen by God, nevertheless, the "specifics of language" of
scripture are "cond itioned by the capacities. education, cultural
contex t, time and place of the inspired writer to whom God
speaks" (p.57). Like evangelicals, Robinson appears to want a
guarantee of scri ptural correctness while allowing for the limitations and errors of its human authors. He wants to have his cake
and eat it too. Moreover. it is even inconsistent with Latter-day
17 I base my conclusion on the fact that Robinson says: "The initial rcvelation may be divine, but human languages and cultures are not" (p. 57). "' I think
that informed Latter-day Saints wi ll affirm with me thai the present books of the
Bible are the Word of God (within the common parameters of the eighth anicle of
faith and the Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy) and thai the lexls arc
essentially correct in thei r present form" (p. 63). I consider myself an in formed
Lauer.day Saint. and I do not think that any righl.thinking Lauer.day Saint
ought to acccpt the Chicago Statemenl. If I am wrong in my conclusions aboul
Robinson' s views of inerrancy then I am happy to be corrected.
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Saint scripture to assert that the original revelat io n was wi thout
error, because the Book of Mormo n writers repeatedl y affirm that
their origi nal autographs may contai n errors,lS Acceptance of the
inerrancy of sc ripture is also inconsiste nt with Joseph Smit h's
practice of making c hanges. some of them doctrinall y significant,
in subsequent editions of the Book of Mormon and the Doctrine
and Covenants (Book of Co mmand me nt s).19 If the scripture co ntains God's very words, as the C hicago Statement claims. then no
person cou ld im prove o n or dare change the words of the reve lations as Joseph Smith did. Th at is why evange licals are scandali zed
a nd ex pect Mormons 10 be bot hered when they reveal (as Ih ey
suppose)20 that there have been numerous textua l c hanges 10 the
Book of Mormon and Ihe Doc trine and Cove nants. However,
Latter-day Saints need not be bothered by Ihe assu mption of in errancy implicit in the arguments from suc h textual changes because nei ther Mormon sc riptures nor Joseph Smith buy into that
assumpti o n.
Robinson stresses that "t he recording. transmission and in te rpretation of the word depends o n fa ll ible hu man bei ngs. using the
fu.ll ible human lools of reason and language . Th us, Scripture is the
word of God for Latter-day Saints, 'as fa r as it is trans laled co rrect ly'" (p . 57). He asserts that Mormons can be "g uaranteed"
the correctness of the ir tex ts pri marily because of the presence of
li ving prophets (p.57). In response to criticism from Blomberg
that the Joseph Sm ith Translati on (JST) adds to and changes the

18 Ncphi proclaimed: "And now, if 1 do crr ... ; not that I would excuse
myself because of other men, but because of the weakness which is in me. according to the nesh. I would cxcuse mysc1f' ( I Nephi 19:6). Mormon concurrcd:
"And if there be faults lin his record] they be the faults of a man. But behold. we
know no fault'· (Mormon R:17). Moroni2 clarified: "Condemn me not because of
mine imperfection, neither my father, bee:lUsc of his imperfection. neithcr them
who have written before him; but rathcr give than ks unto God that he hat h made
manifest unto you our imperfections, that ye may learn 10 be more wise Ihan we
have been" (Mormon 9:31). "And if we cou ld have written in Hebrew, behold. ye
would have had no imperfection in our record" (Mormon 9:33) .
19 See Karl F. Best, "Changes in the Revelations. 1833 10 1835:' Dialogue 2511 (1992): 87- 112.
20 The LDS Church has authorized publication of original editions of thc
Book of Mormon and Book of Commandments which would make such changes
obvious to any careful studen t.
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Bible in a way that seems to be inconsistent with the notion of inerrancy accepted by both of them, Robin son points ou t that:
In 1828 the word translation was broader in its meaning than it is now, and the Joseph Smith translation
(JST) should be understood to con tain additional revelati on, alternate readings, prophetic commentary o r
midrash, harmonization, clarification and corrections of
the original as well as correction s to the origi nal. ...
Joseph Smi th often saw more than one meaning in a
passage and brou ght many of these explicitly to our
attention by means of the JST. (p. 64)
Joseph Sm ith never explained how he was "trans lating" the Book of Abraham in the Pearl of Great Price
and I do not claim to know the relationship between
Joseph's Egyptian papyri and the fini shed text. (p. 65)
Blomberg correctly points out that this view of inspi ration is differen t and, to him at least, less objectionable than insistence on a
literal translation. Blomberg affirms that if:
"Tran slati on" includes interpretation, adaptation and
appli cation, if the media of plates and scrolls were
merely a means to an end-proclai ming the gospel irrespect ive of the literal significance of the written characters-then these debates fabout the hi storicity o f
Mormon scriptu re I diminish somewhat in importance.
( p. 53)
I believe that both Robinson and Blomberg are correct: If the
JST, and Joseph Smith 's translations of the Book of Mormon and
the books of Moses and Abraham contai n prophetic commentary
or midrash, harmonization, clarifications, and corrections. then
many problems regarding the hi storicity of Latter-day Sai nt
scripture can be resolved . We can agree with Robinson that Jose ph
Smith was not merel y reproducing or restoring original texts because "his main concern was not merely to reproduce God's
word to ancient prophets but also to produce a correct text for the
use of Latter-day Sai nts in the latter days" (p. 64). Robinson may
limit this process of prophetic expans ion to the translation of the
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Bible that resulted in the JST, bUll do nOI see how he can consis~
(enlly do so because Joseph Smith also used the word translation
to describe his activity in producing the Book of Mormon and the
Book of Abraham. In addition, the book of Moses and Joseph
Smith-Matthew in the Pearl of Great Price, which are accepted as
sc ripture by Latter-day Saints. were produced as part of Joseph
Smith 's work to translate the Bible that resulted in the JST. Allow ing prophetic expansion by prov iding midrashic commentary.
clarifications. and corrections is consistent with Joseph Sm il h's
revisions and clarifications of later editions of the Doctrine and
Covenants and Book of Mormon . Robinson thus defends Joseph
Smith in produc ing the JST by allow ing prophetic expansions and
clarifications to the biblical text as part of the meaning of the
word translatioll (as it was used by Joseph Sm ith).
Robi nson's response to Blomberg is especially interesting (to
me at least) because he roundl y rejected a similar argument whic h
I made in 1987 to defend the Book of Mormon from simi lar
charges. In an art icle entitled "The Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion of an Ancient Sou rce," I argued that Joseph Sm ith
provided "authoritative commentary, interpretation, explanati on,
and c larifications" to the ancient text of the Book of Mormon. 21

21 Blake T. Ostler, ''The Book of Mormon as a Modem Expansion of an
Ancient Source," Dialogue 2011 ( 1987): 66. My position follows largely from
developments in semantic field theory. As Alister E. McGrath. in lustitia Dej: A
History of the Christian Doctrine of Justificatjon. From the Beginnings to 1500
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). 9, noted:
The difficulties attending the translation of the Old Testament into
any second language, whether modcm English or Hellenistic Greek, are
well illustrated by the application of semantic field theory. The
semantic field of a word includes not merely ils synonyms, bul also ils
anlony ms, ho monyms and homophones. As such, it is much broader
tha n the lexjcal field, which may be defined very precisely in terms of
words which are closely associated with one anOlher. The enormous
size of such semantic fields may be illustrated from the associative field
of the French word chat, which is estimated to consist of some two
thousand words. TIle translation of a word into a different language
inevitably involves a distonion of the semantic field, so that certain
nuances and associations present in the original cannot be conveyed in
a translation. and new nuances and associations not already prese nt
make their appearance. TIle word chosen to translate the original will
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As a result, I argued that many of the elements of the Book of
Mormon that appeared to be modern to critics could be explained
as deriving from the interpretation inherent in the process of
revelalion and translation that resulted in the Book of Mormon. r n
my view, a proper translation requires e xpansion and expla nation.
For exa mple, the Hebrew term be.~ed could be translated merely as
"covenan t-love, " but such a translation fails to convey the richness and depth of the concept. A proper translation of this one
word mi ght require an entire chapter to explain God's grac iou s
dealings with Israel in deli vering the Hebrews from Egypt, the
exodus, and the history of God's continual acceptance of his
covenant people even in the face of their constant rejection of
him. Thus finding words and concepts that seem to be peculiar to
the nineteenth century in the Book of Mormon is not proof that it
does not derive from an ancient text, given the nature of th e
translation . My argument was essentially as follows :
I . All human experience in vol ves human interpretation.
2. Revelation (translation) is, at least to some extent, a human
ex pe rie nce.
3 . Therefore, reve lation (trans lation) resulting in the Book of
Mormon tex t involves, at least in pan, human inte rpretation.
However, I fail to see any difference between my view of the
Book of Mormon tran slati on and Robin son's view of the Joseph
Smith tran slati on of the Bible. If Joseph Smith could provide
comme ntary, midrash, exp lanation . and clarification of the biblical
text as part of the inspired biblical text itself. then why couldn ' t he
do the same for the Book of Mormon translation ?22

itself have a we ll-established seman tic field, so that an alien set of
associations will be imposed upon the word in question.
McGrath notes the numerous difficulties surrounding the tra nslat ion of t heological terms in particular, including the very basic concepts of sedaqa (Hebrew).
(Iikaiosyne (Greek), and iustitia (Latin). all translaled as "justification" or
"righteousness" in the scriptures. but having numerous scparale meanings and
connotat ions that translation cannot convey.
22 Stephen E. Robinson. 'The 'Expanded' Book o r MormonT in The
Book of Mormon: Second Ne"hi, the Doc"inl)1 SlrIlclure, ed. Monte S. Nyman
and Charles D. Tate Jr. (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 1989),
39\-4\4.
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Robinson appears to have changed his mind somewhat regard ing whether scripture has been expanded by prophets in the
translation process to include interpretation and inspired expansio n. If so, the n I commend him for his willing ness to rethink issues in ligh t of evidence. If he limits such prophetic expansion ,
interpretatio n, and co mmentary to the JST, then I would inquire as
to why such inspired " midrash ic comme ntary " is all right with
the Bible as evidenced in the }ST and not in the Book of Mormon,
which Joseph Smith also fe lt free to modify and clarify in subsequent editions.
Given the recognitio n by both Blomberg and Robinson that a
mode of translat ion that allows fo r inspired interpretation and
commentary resolves problems regarding the hi storicity of Lallerday Saint scriptures, I was di sappointed in their exc hange on this
subject. Blomberg argues that the Mormon scri ptures, including
the Book o f Mormon, appear to fit perfectly into the nineteenth
century because they "seem" to him to contain Arminian influences (see pp. 5 1-52). In response to Blomberg, Robin son says
that it "seems" otherwise to him (see pp. 65-66). Given Blomberg's acceptance of the notion o f translation proposed by Robinson, why is that an issue? The Book of Mormon and o ther
Latter-day Sain t scriptures cou ld contai n phrases, words, and even
concepts influe nced by the nineteenth century, and still have
originated with ancient tex ts as the source of the translation, because they were translated "by the g ift and power of God" by a
nineteenth-century prophet. Once we have acknowledged that interpretation is a part of the translation process, modern influences
and interpretations in the tex t are no longer proof that the pretranslated text was not a nc ient. Further, why docs Robinson deny
the possibility of nineteenth-century Arminian influences in Mormon scriptu res, including the Book of Mormon, after he has admilled repeatedly that many Mormon doctrines are thoroughly
Arminian, and even that his ow n view of grace is properly termed
"Armin ian ism"? (pp. 146, 159). It seems inconsistent to me to
assert that Mormon doctrines are largely Arminian but that Mormon sc riptures are nol.
In my view Robinson should have said , given his view of
translation: "Well , sure the Mormon sc riptu res show influences of
nineteenth-century Arminiani sm. Given Joseph Smith's Methodist
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leanings and the interpretation inherent in translation, that is what
one wou ld expect. But what you have not explained are all th e
ancient aspects of the Book of Mormon, such as genu inely ancient Israel ite prophetic call forms, exact Israelite judicial procedures, and ancient covenant renewal festivals in the Book of
Mormon. "23 I have never seen an adequate ex pl anation for these
types of ancient patterns discovered through form-critical analysis
except for Joseph Smith 's. i.e" that he translated an ancient record
by the gift and power of God. That is what Robinson shou ld have
asked Blomberg to ex plain- in my opinion.

A More Consistent View of Scriptural Inspiration
If inerrancy is rejected, how should we think of the "Word of
God" that we agree is contai ned in the sc riptures? Instead of inerrancy. I believe that Latter-day Saints should accept a view o f
revelation/translat ion as "c reative copart icipat ion" involving both
di vine insp iration and human interpretation. The scripture is inspired because God imparted knowledge to prophets/writers" i n
the ir weakness, after the manner of their language, that they mi ght
come to understanding" (D&C I :24). Scripture is the Word of
God as proclaimed in the eighth Article of Faith because God has
23 I discussed these ancient "form-critical" featurcs of thc Book. of Mormon in my anicle, '1'he Book of Mormon as a Modern Expansion," 87- 100;
and 'The Throne-Thcophany and Prophetic Commission in I Nephi: A FormCritical Analysis:' nyu Studies 26/4 ( 1986): 67-95. Some, of course, claim
that the translation of the Book of Mormon was so literal that it prcserved
Hebrew syntall . Sec, for ellample. Royal Skousen. "Translaling the Book of
Mormon," in Hook of Mormon Au/horship Rel'isiled: The Evidence for Ancient
Origins, cd. Noel B. Reynolds ( Provo, Utah: FARMS, 1997), 61-93. I view that
position as elltrcmely unlikely because such a literal translatio n would resu lt in
nonsense in English. Wherever we have a Hebrew tClIttO compare to the Book of
Mormon translation, il is the KJ V syntall that is used (often word for word) rather
than a literal Hebrew translation. For example. a literal translation of the Hcbrew
in Ezek iel 37:16--17 (paraphrased in the Book of Mormon at 2 Nephi 3: 11-12)
reads: "Son of Man. tak.e yooT1ielf stick onc and write on iI, for Judah and for Ihe
sons of Israel. his companions. And take stick one and write on it for Joseph the
slick of Ephraim and all the house of Israel, his companions:
. and they sha ll
become ones in your hand." It seems tra nsparent to me that the Book of Mormon
renders the translation in a KJ V idiom and does not preserve a literal Hebrcw
syntax- but no meaningfu l translation could preserve such a syntall faithfully .
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breathed know ledge into the prophet s in their own lang uage a nd
according to their varyin g capacities to understand . Thus the in spiration of scriptu re is not experie nced by the prophetJwrite r free
of human inte rpretati on, cultura l biases, and conceptua l limitatio ns. In Lauer-day Sa int scripture, re ve lation is ex pe rie nced fro m
within a di vine-human relationship that respects the perso nh ood
and free agency of the prophet/writer. The hu man cogniti ve categories that the prophet/writer uses to organ ize reality and ma ke
sense of his ex perience are nol obliterated by the revelation, a nd
thus the revelation expresses both God 's in spiratio n and the
prophet's personality and limi ted understanding. The ultimate
reality in Mo rmon th oug ht is not an o mnipo tent God who cau sa ll y determines passive and powerless prophets to regurg itate hi s
words as dictated . God acts on the proph et/writer and imparts his
will and message, bUl receivi ng the message and ex press ing it arc,
at least partl y, up to the indi vidu al. who is also free to act fo r himse lf. In this view, scriptural inspirati on is not an intru sion o f th e
supernatural into th e natural order. It is human copartic ipali on
with God in creating the sc ripture.
In Latter-day Sai nt scri pture, the prophet/writer is an acti ve
partic ipant in creating scripture toget he r with God. Revelation is
nOI the fi ll in g o f a mental void with di vine content. It is the sy nthesis of human and d ivine event. The prophet is a coauthor an d
active partic ipant in conceptua lizin g, verbalizin g, and ex press ing
the message of scripture in language meaningful to hi s co nte mporaries. That is why we call it the "Gospe l according to Matthew,"
or Mark, or Luke, because il is a parti cular view o f a parti cular
pe rson li vin g in a particular time and cu lture who also took part in
authoring the text.
Further, thi s view of scriptural in spirati on does not pre clude
pro pos itional revelation. As semant ic fi e ld theory has de mo nstrated , the inspired lan guage of the scriptures can be unde rstood
o nl y in the full con text of the cu lture and world views or paradigms fro m which the language derives . The sc riptures are no t
writlen fro m the di vine point of view by God, free of pa rti cu lar
cultural and ling uistic constra ints; they are written from the hu man perspective, within a particular time, language, culture, an d
thought- world . That is why all biblica l scholars, even evange lical s.
atte mpt to learn the original languages and the setting of the a n-
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cien t world from which the scripture derives. Such background is
necessary to enable one to grasp the meaning of the scripture. But
the very recog nition that the scripture reflects the views of particular human s writing in a particular culture and language is in
tens ion with scriptural inerrancy. The very activity of learning
about human languagl:; and ancient cultures as a nl:;cl:;ssary back ground to scri ptural exegesis assumes that the biblical records refl ect human temporal constraints and limitations-horizons, from
the human view. These horizons include prescientific worldviews,
tribal ethics, and a limited and often erroneous understanding of
history. All this is perfectly acceptable and understandable because the writers of sc ripture were no less human than we are; no
person can escape his own sk in . In contrast, inerrancy assumes
that sc riptures are written from God's perspective, which is free
from the human limitations giving rise to prescientific world views.
That is why the Chicago Stateme nt asserts that the scriptures are a
reliable guide in all matters scientific and historical as well as relig ious and ethical. Scriptural inerrancy shou ld be rejected in favor of the view that sc riptural inspiration includes a human who
must interpret the divine message from the human perspective. In
doing so, the inspiration may be reduced to propositi ons takin g
the customary linguistic forms. One must not exclude the propositional understanding of revelation . but any understanding o f
the sc ri ptural propositions must be kept in relati on to the lin guistic
structure and the human frame of reference in which alone the
propositions have meanin g.
This view of scriptural in spiration is superior to inerrancy because it allows both for divine authority of sc ripture and also for
human perspectives and understandings. This view can actually be
reconciled with the facts without distorting or ignoring many biblical passages. It makes sense of the scriptures as they actually are
instead of as we assume they must be to satisfy our need for an
absolute guarantee of correc tness. In Latter-day Saint theology,
only Satan offers absolute guarantees of salvation at the disregard
of human agency (see D&C 29; Moses 4:3). This view makes
honest sense of what we actually find in the scriptures, while still
recognizi ng divine inspiration.
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Robinson on God and Deification of Humans
I be lieve that Robin son has elucidated a profound and insightful view of de ity and grace. Moreover. his views of the God head ,
human de ificatio n. and grace form a compl ex of imerre latcd and
consisten t assertions. i.e., a theulugy . Here I will summari ze hi s
theology of the Godhead and human dei ricali on:
I. The Father. Son, and Holy Ghost arc three separate divine
persons who are one God head in virtue of "oneness of mind, purpose. power, and intent" (see pp. 128-30).
2. The Son and the Hol y Ghost are subordinate to the Father
and depe nde nt on the ir relationship of indwelling unity with the
Father for their divinity-that is, the Father is the source or fount
of div inity of the Son and Hol y Ghost (see p. 132).
3. If the oneness of the Son or Holy Ghost wit h the Father
should cease, so would the ir divinity (see p. 132).
4 . Human beings may become gods through grace by becoming one with the individual di vine persons in the same sense as
the divine persons are one with each other (see p. 82).
5. Humans are eternally subordinate to and dependent o n
their relationship of loving un ity with the di vine persons fo r the ir
status as "gods" (p.86).
6. By act ing as one with the Godhead, divinized humans will
share fully in the knowledge, power, and glory of God, but they
wi ll never be separately worthy of worshi p nor will they be a
source of divinity of others (see p. 86).
I want to emphasize that Robinson has done an outstanding
job in describing how humans become "'gods" that is consistent
both with Mormon sc riptures and the Bible. I believe that the
foregoin g propositions are supported by the biblical passages
q uoted by Robinson together with Doctrine and Covenants 93 and
the Lectures on Faith . However, his discussion regarding ho w and
when God the Father became "'God" leaves a bit to be des ired .
Let me explain why.
I believe that Latter-day Saints common ly believe that God the
Father became God through a process of moral developme nt an d
eternal progression to godhood. The corollary of thi s view is that
there was a time before God th e Father was a god or divi ne.
Robinson correctly points oul Ihat no Mormon scripture support s
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this view; rather, it is an inference from noncanonical statements
made hy Joseph Smith in the Kin g Follett Di scourse and by Presi-

dent Lorenzo Snow, who coi ned the couplet : "As man now is,
God once was; as God now is, man may become" (see p. 87).
However, his assertion is questionable that "w hat God did before
the beginning . . . lisl unfortunately not the [subject) of biblical
informati on" (p.86). Robinson tries to argue that when th e
scriptures say that God is "eternal ," they are usually translating
the Hebrew 'olam or the Greek aion. both of which can mean an
indefinite period of time. Robinson is clearly correct that these
words decidedly do not mean that God is timeless in the sense that
he experiences no temporal succession . However. Robinson's interpretation that they cannot mean without beginning or end al)
the English word eternal connotes is extremely strained.
Moreover, the problem arises not so much from the Bible
bUl from Mormon scripture. The Latter-day Saint scriptures say
that "t here is a God in heaven. who is infin ite and eternal. from
everlasting to everlasting the same unchangeable God" (D&C
20: 17). "[Thel Father. Son, and Holy Ghost are one God, infinite
and eternal. without end" (D&C 20:28). When the term eternal is
conj oined with infinite and from everlastin g to everlasting. it is
pretty clear that it means without beginning or end. The notion o f
infinity usuall y means unlimited. without bounds--directly co ntrary to Robinson's assertion that eternal in the Bible means an
age that has a bounded beginning and a bounded end.
Other Mormon scriptures arc even clearer: " Behold. I am the
Lord God Almighty. and Endless is my name; for I am without
beginning of days or end of years; and is not this endless?"
(Moses 1:3). "For I know that God is not a partial God, neither a
changeable being; but he is unchangeable from all eternity to all
etern ity" (Moron i 8: 18). Further, Joseph Smith declared in 184 0
that: "I be lieve that God is eternal. That He had no beginning.
and can have no end . Eternity means that which is without beginning or end. "24 Given this clarification, it see ms pretty clear to
me that these scriptures mean that God has always been God in the
sa me unchan gi ng sense without beginning. Are the King Follett

24 Lyndon Cook and Andrew Ehat. comps. and cds., The Words oj Joseph
Smith (provo. Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center. 1984), 33, emphasis added.
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Discourse and President Snow's coupl et si mply inconsistent with
sc ripture? It seems to me that several possibilities can be ex pl ored
here.
For purposes of clarity in this di scussion, I will need to make a
few distinctions. The word God is equi vocal in Mormon thought,
and in Christian thought in general, because it can have many different references. For example, the Father, the Son, or the Holy
Ghost can each be referred to individually as "God." I suspect
that most references to God in the New Testament refer solely to
God the Father. However, when 1 speak of the divine persons individually, I will use the locutions Father, Son, or Holy GhOSI. I will
use the biblical term Godhead to refer to these three individual
divine persons as one God united in indwelling g lory, power, dominion, and love. I will use the term God as an equivocal refe rence where it is unclear whethe r the reference is to one of the in dividual divine persons or to the God head . I will use the term
god(s) 10 refer 10 humans who become divine through atoning
grace. Finally, I will use the nonscriptural term divine beitlgs to
refer to the nonscriptural "gods" who supposedly ex isted as
"gods" before the Father became a divine person. Now for my
besl c rack at responding to this difficuh question.
One cou ld understand the scriptura l references to an "e ternal
God" (0 refer solely to God [he Father as an individual divine
person. One could take the position that when "God" says he is
eternal and without beginning, he is referring merely to the personal existence of the Father as a beginning less spirit or intelligence and not to his status as a divine person. Thus the Father has
always existed as an ind ividual without beginn ing, but he has not
always been "God." There was a time when the Father was not
divine in this view. However, it necd not impl y that there were no
divine beings before the Fat her became d ivine because, as I unde rstand the impl ications drawn by Latte r-day Saints such as Orson
Pratt and B. H. Roberts, supposedly an infinite cha in of divine
beings existed before the Father. 25 It was obedience to these divine beings and their commandments by whic h the Father became
25 I have discussed the views of Orson Pr:lU. 8. H. Robe rts, and others rcg:lrding the st:ltus of the divine beings in Blake T. Ostler, ''T'hc Ide:l of Preexistence in the Development of Mormon Thought." Dia/oglle 15/ 1 (1982):
59- 78 .
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divine in this view, as I understand it. The problem with Ihis view is
thai it seems to contradict the scriptures that say that "the Lord
God Almighty" is without beg inning of days. It is also hard to
square with the sc riptures that assert that God is the same unchangin g God from all eternity. Moreover, this position seems to
cont radict Robinson's view that it is a divine relationship of loving
unity with God the Father that constitutes the source of divinity of
the Son, the Hol y Ghost, and god(s) (see pp.86, 130-32). I believe that Doctrine and Covenants 93 teaches that the Son is di vine
in virtue of hi s indwelling unity with the Father and that mortal s
become god(s) by becoming one, just as the Father and the Son
are one. In this sc ripture, the Father is the source or fount of divinity of all other divine beings. If the Father is the source of
divinity, then it certai nly seems inconsistent to assert that the Father became divine in dependence on some other divine beings,
for then the Father is not the ultimate source of divinity. Thus the
view that the Father became di vine in dependence on other divine
beings and was not divine from all eternity is not sc riptural-and
it seems to contradict both the uniquely Mormon scriptures and
the Bible.
On the other hand, one cou ld understand "God from all eternity to all ete rnity" to refer to the Godhead rather than to any of
the individual divine persons separately. It is not true that if there
has always been a Godhead that all the di vine persons const ituting
the Godhead have always been divine. Thus, when the Word was
made nesh and became mortal by leaving aside the divine unity of
co mplete oneness with the Father and Holy Ghost, the Son "e mp tied himself' of hi s divinity and beca me mortal while the Father
and Holy Ghost remained di vine as members of the Godhead.
What is true of the indi vidual divine persons separately is not nec essarily true of the divine persons united as one in the Godhead.
For example, atoms of hydrogen and oxygen considered separately have very different propeflie s than two atoms of hydrogen
and one alOm of oxygen joined in one e ntity in a molecular unity
to form water. Analogously, the indi vidual divine persons could
have very different properties considered indi vidually than when
the Godhead acts, think s, and wills as one God. Thus, when the
sc riptures say that "God is from everlast ing to everlast ing the
same unchangeable God," it means that the Godhead has always
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manifested all the essential properties of godhood (whatever they
may be). but the ind ividual d ivine persons may not always have
possessed a ll the properties of godhood indiv id ua lly. In ot he r
words. there was a lime when the Father took on hi mse lf mortality
j ust as there was a time when the Son became morta l, but there was
a Godhead before. during, and after that lime .26
This latter view seems to be more consistent with the scriptures
to me. Moreover, it need not e nta il that the Father became God
after an etern ity of not having ever been di vine, or that there was a
lime before which the Father was not d ivine . Rather, when we say
thaI "as man now is, God once was," it seems more consisten t to
say that j ust as the Son was di vine before becomi ng morta l (a nd
was in fact very God as Yahweh of the O ld Testament), so also the
Fat her was di vine from all eternity without begin ning befo re he
became mortal. T he scriptures seem to assert that the God head is
the sa me unchangeab le and everl asting God from all etern ity
without beginning. References to "t he same unchangeable God"
in Mormon scripture ofte n exp lici tly refer in context to the Father,
Son, and Holy G host as one God.27 They also seem to say that
although the Son was made fl esh, he was an ind iv idual divine person before mortality fro m all eternity, It is often not certain
whether scriptures or sermons refer to God the Father or the So n
as individua l divine persons or to the Godhead. However, if the
26 It should also be noted that a failure to distinguish between "God" as
the Godhead and "God" as an individual divine person may also have led to a misunderstanding by evangelicals and ot her~ about Mormon claims that ''God'' is a
glorified man and otherwise anthropomorphic, Lauer.day Saints do 1101 claim
Ilwllht' Godhead ir a glorified man, further, those evangelicals and other Chri stians who accept a kenotic theory of Christology can hardly object to the view
that hGod" as a divine person has a glorified or resu rrected body, As Ronald J ,
Feenstra observed: "If the exalted Christ is human, then we have good reason to
hope that we human beings can also be glorified in an eschatological existence.
since it will fo llow that being human is compatihle wit h being glorified, Both
Lutheran and Reformed confessions have held that the ascended Christ retai ns his
body", If Christ is still embodied, he remai ns incarnate and therefore truly
human," See Feenstra. "Reconsidering Kenotic ChrislOlogy," in Rona ld J ,
Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga J r.. cds .. Trinit)', f,'ClIrnmiOl', (u,d AlOnl'/IINI/:
Plli/orof'/rica/ (/lid The%gical £srays (Notre Dame: Univcrsity or Notre Dame
Press, 1989), 147.
27 This is the case in Doctrine and Covenants 20: 17,28; Mosiah 15:2-5:
Al ma 11 :44: 3 Nephi 11 :36.
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Son only does what he has seen the Father do before him, as
Joseph Smith asserted in the King Follett discourse, then the Father was also divine before becoming mortal just as the Son was
before being made flesh. 28 Robinson endorses the idea that we
should view the Father's having once been mortal as analogous to
Ihe Son's incarnation: "To those who are offended by Joseph
Smith's suggestion that God the Father was once, before the beginning, a man, I point out that God the Son was undoubtedly
once a man, and that did not compromise his divinity" (p. 91). Of
course, thi s argument is less compe lling if the Father was not
divine before his incarnation or condescension, for then the parallel with the Son's experience of mortality would be somewhat
co mpromi sed.

Robinson on the Nature of God
Robinson objects to referring to God in Mormon thought as
"fi nite, limited or changeable" (p. 88). He implicitly disagrees
with the conclusion of many LDS philosophers that the God described in Mormon thought is "finite" because he's never heard
any such proposition presented in church (p.92).29 Of course,
I've never heard Hugh Nibley's views on Zion in church either,
but that does not make them false or even suspect. However, I
think that a good deal of confusion regarding talk of a "f inite "
God in Mormon thought arises from the failure to distinguish
between references to "God" as the Godhead and references to
28 In the King Follett Discourse. Joseph Smith affirms: "What did Jesus
Christ do. the samc thing as t se[elthe Fathcr do." Joseph Smith was quoting
from John 5:19, which says: "Verily., vcrlly. I say unto you. The Son can do
nothing of himself, but what hc seeth the Father do: for what things soever hc
doeth, these also docth the Son likewise:' Joseph Smith took this scripture literally. so that the Son docs exactly what the Father did before him. See The
Words of Joseph Smilh. 345 and n. 41.
29 That God is "finite" has been asserted by several Mormon philosophers. including David L. Paulsen, formerly holdcr of the Richard L. Evans Chair
for Religious Understanding at BYU, in "Comparative Coherency of Mormon
(Finitislic) and Classic:!l Theism" (Ph.D. diss., Uni ve rsity of Michigan, 1975);
Kent E. Robson. ''Time and Omniscience in Mormon Theology." Suns/one 5
(May-June 1980): 17-23: Sterling M. McMurdo. The Tlle%gica/ Foundations
of tilt Mormon Religion (Salt Lake City: Un i ver~ity of Utah Press. 1965): :!nd
Blake T . Ostler, "The Mormon Conccpt of God," Dialogue 17/2 (1984): 65-93.
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"God" as one of the individual divine persons. The divine persons may be limited in ways that the Godhead is not. For example,
each of the divine persons is limited to space-lime by virtue of
their corporea lity; however, the Godhead is nOI corporeal. While
the individual divine persons cannot be o mnipresent in the sense
of being spirituall y present to all things, that does not make it impossible for the spi rit of the Godhead that proceeds from their
presence to fill the immensity of all space and to be in a nd
through all Ih ings.30 The divine persons are not essentially or by
nature all-powerful, or all-knowing, for if they empty themselves
of the ir divine glo ry by leaving aside the indwelling unilY of the
Godhead and become mortal (a concept known as kenosis in
theolog ical discussion) they are not all-knowing or all-powerful
but mortal. 3l However, the God head is eHentially all -knowing
and all -powerfu l, for these are auributes of god hood which inhere
in thi s relationship of indwe lling love. Thus the divine persons may voluntaril y take on themselves limitations which" God"
as the Godhead cannot experience . The discussions of God as
" finit e" in Mormon thought (my own included) see m to refer
exclus ively to "God" as a divine person and e ither ignore the implications of "God" as a Godhead or commit the fallacy of composition by assuming that the properties of di vine persons are the
sa me as the properties of the Godhead .32
30 See Doctrine and Covenants 88:7- 13, 4 1-44. These scriptural verses
make it very clear that "GO(rS" omnipresence consists not merely in having
innuence everywhere, but in actually being present immanentl y in and through
all things. Given the understanding of a category distinction between the divine
persons and the Godhead, thcre is no logical problem in underslandi ng the
Godhead's spirit to be present to all things.
3 1 This view follows immediately from Robinson's view, which I heartily
endorse, that "the divine Son and the divine Holy Spirit are subordinale to th e
Father and dependent on their oneness with him for their divinity. They cannot
stand alone; they are 'God' only as they arc one with the Father in the Godhead.
If their oneness with the Father should cease, so would their divinity" (p. 132).
It follows thai when Christ left the 10lal indwelling unity of the Godhead to
become mortal he was no longer divine. However, as the unity was restored Jesus
became divine, I believe thai Robinson is correct in this doct rine and Ihat it is
taught in Doctrine and Covenants 93. Thus a Christology is implicit in this view
of the Godhead.
32 Sterling McMurrin consistently confuses the properties of the divine
persons with those of Godhead in The Tireological f oundations of the Mormon
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We need to be more careful when we speak of the Mormon
God as "fini te." When Latter-day Saint philosophers have referred to God as "finite," they mean something different than
Blomberg and others critical of Mormon views infer. When Mormon philosophers refer to God as "finite," they mean merely that
"God" is not the absolute defined by classical theologians; they
do not mean that "God" is merely a limited being who is less
than supreme or maximally great as Blomberg infers. Regardless
of the sense in which the word God is used, the biblical God is
"finite" in the sense thai God is not the metaphysical absolute of
Greek metaphysics, particularly Platonism and Aristotelianism.
Blomberg and others refer to God as "infinite" in the apparent
sense that God is absolutely infinite and unlimited )3 However, it
is doubtful that any person in the Christian tradition can affirm
that God is infinite or absolute in this sense. If "God" were abso lutely unlimited, he would be necessarily the whole of reality
and not a Creator as contemplated in the scriptures. The JudeoChristian scriptures envision a God who creates beings dist inct
from himself. 34 Thus God is not the whole of reality and is delimited by the existence of bt:.ings thai have real existence and a

measure of independence from God. Further, a God who is not
limited in any sense could not have any definite attributes. For
examp le, if God is necessarily immaterial then he is limited in the
sense that he could not be corporeal or embodied, or if God were
necessaril y good then he would be limited in the sense that he
cou ld not exercise moral agency in the presence of a genuine
possibility of doing wrong. Moreover, God is personal in Christian
thought, and personality implies some degree of limitation. For
Religion. However. a review of McMurrin's fallacy involves a more detailed
examination than is possible here.
33 It is precisely in this mi sunderstanding of the way Mormon writers use
the term finile that evangelicals such as Francis Beckwith and Stephen Parrish
go wrong. See their Tile Mormon Concept of God: A Philosophical Analysis
(Lewiston: Mellen. 1991). They therefore fundamentally misunderstand the
Mormon view of God. Sec my review of their book in FARMS Review of Books
8/2 (1996): 99-146.
34 In thi s sense. only pantheistic philosophers ~ueh as Spinoza can
consistently adopt the view that God is absolutely infinite; theists who make
such assertions either do not understand what they assert or assert something
incoherent .
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instance, choosing among altematives. planning an undetermined
future, and interacting with the world are all activities of God described in the Bible that imply temporal limitation s. 35 The biblical
God is personal and therefore "finite" in the sense that he stands
in relation to the world and is distinct from it.
It is appropriate

10

call the personal God of the Bible (even

allowing for several different views of God among different biblical writers) "finite" in this sense because God is clearly delimited
by personality and limitations inherent in that concept. 36 Further.
a mere limitation as such need not be bad. For example. limitations on stupidity, cruelty, or capriciousness are good. Thus limitations per se do not detract from the greatness of deity; rather, the
nature of the limitation must be considered. For instance, allowing
free agency certainly limits God's options in specific ways and
opens the world to risks of evil (and God to risks of pain) that otherwise God could completely control. However, granting agency
to other intrinsically valuable persons so that they can grow morally is so valuable that it justifies the inherent divine risks and
limitations. A God who is limited by the genuine agency of other
intrinsically valuable beings may be considered "greater" or
more perfect than a god who is not so limited, because such a
being is morally superior.37 Thus the absence of a limitation may,
in some circumstances, provide a " being " who is less worthy of

35 In this conte;t(t see Richard Swinburne. TII~ Ch ristian God (O;t(rord:
Clarendon. 1994). 137-44: and Tire Cohuence oj Theism. rev. ed. (Odord:
Clarendon, 1993). 223-29; and Robert R. Cook. "God. Time and Freedom,"
Religious Studies 23 (1987): 8 1- 94 .
36 See Edmond laB. Cherbonnier. 'The Logic of Biblical Anthropomorphism." Harvard Theological Review 55 ( 1962): 187-209.
37 The funher queslion as 10 whether the limitation is a self-limitation occasioned by God's own choices rather than by his nalure (which is logically
prior 10 hi s will or power of intellect) would also have to be considered. Evangelicals have distinguished between God's absolute power de polentia absoluta
possessed (logically) prior to any decisions regarding creation and his power de
POlentia ordifl(lta based on limitations that God imposes on himself by deciding
which world 10 create and to enter into covenant promises wilh his creation.
However, if the decision arises from God's essentially loving nature. then the
distinction may not hold up. See Berndt Hamm, Promissio. pactum, ordinatio:
Freiheit und Selbstbindung Goues in der scholastisclren Gnadenlehre (Tubingen:
Mohr. 1977).
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worship, not quite as "g reat," as a God who is limited by loving,
interpersonal relationships.
In add ition, God the Creator is condit ioned in Mormon
thought in a way that God in class ical theo logy is not. As a result
of the reject ion of the non biblical doctrine of creation out of absolute nothing (crearjo ex njhj/o), the Mormon God is co nditi oned
by an eternal natural environ ment of space-ti me and an eternal
soc ial environ ment of eternal intelligences. For ex.ample, God in
Mormon thought could not have a uni verse without other entities,
whereas the God of classical theology could have a universe
without an y beings other than himself at al1. 38
I want to make two salient points regardin g these limitations
on the divine sovereignty. First, it is often assumed that such limitations are inconsistent with the biblical view. However, thi s assu mption can be justified only by reading into the Bible postbiblical developme nts regardi ng the notion of crearjo ex njhilo.
Very strong arguments have been made demonstrating that the
biblical doctrine of creation includes organization of a "c hao s"
which ex. isted before God's creati ve activities. 39 Thus, while the

38 It should not be inferred that in Mormon thought God could therefore
not have a universe where intelligences do not exell:ise free agency. for the one
Godhead can elearly overpower all other beings and coerce them. Other beings
e xercise their free agency therefore only 31 God's sufferance, bcc::lUse he allows
it. Agency of intelligences is th us a moral and not a metaphysical limitation on
God as divine persons united as one.
39 See Keith Norman, "'Ex Nihilo: The Development of the Doctrines of
God aocl Creation in Eart y Christianity,"' BYU Studies 17/3 (1977): 291-318;
10n D. Levenson. Creation and the Persistence 0/ Evil: The Jewish Drama o/Di·
vine Omnipotence (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1987); Luis
Stadel mann. The Hebrew Conception 0/ the World: A Philological and Lilerary
Study (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institu te. 1970). As Be rnhard W. Anderson
grudgingly concedes: 'The notion of creation out of nothing was undoubtedly
100 abstract for the Hebraic mind; in any case. the idea of a created chaos would
have been strange to a narrative that is governed by the view that creation is the
antithesis to chaos (cf. Isa. 45: 18)." Bernhard W. Anderson, From Creation to
New Creation: Old Tesrame11l Perspectives (Mi nnealXllis; Fortress, 1994). 30.
The development of the traditional doctrine of crealio ex nihilo fro m issues presented by Greek phi losophy. particularly Ncoplatonism. is well documented in
Edwin H:lIch. Tire Influence 0/ Greek Ideas on Chri.ftianity (G loucester: Smith.
1970). 194-98.
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philosoph ical ass umpti on that God is absolute ly unlimited may
require creation out o f nothing. that is not the biblical view.
Second. creatio n by o rganizing chaos is no t inconsiste nt with a
coherent notio n o f omnipotence. I am not aware o f any concept
of divine o mnipotence that is logically consistent but that would
preclude God's creatin g by organiz ing chaos . Definili ons of o mnipote nce must quali fy the absolut ist understand ing of d ivi ne
power by two cond itions in additi on to power to bring abou t a ny
state of affa irs thal is logically possible: ( I) God cannot do o r
bring about an ything inconsistent with his essential attributes; a nd
(2) God cannot bring about any slate of affa irs inconsistent with
what has a lready happened .40 However, because it is log icall y
possible that the world has always ex isted ("world " means
eve rything that exists d istinct from God in this context), it fo ll ows
that God nced not be ab le to c hange the fact that the world has
always existed to be considered o mnipote nt. Thus God is o mnipolent in Mo rmo n thought when the concept is carefu ll y arliculaled. 41 God 's power in Mormon thought is " max im a l" a nd
supreme. No indi vidual being can exercise Ih e kind of power as
the divine persons acting as one agency, fo r they act o n a level o f
real ity d ifferen t fro m mere ind ividuals. No be ing who exerc ises
power in the contex.t of Ihe actual world could possibly ex.erc ise
grealer or more power than the Godhead as conceived in Mo rmon
though t.

40 Sec George I. Mavrodes. "Defining Omnipotence," Ph i!O.fOphica!
Studies 32 (1977): 191 - 202; Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso, "Malima l
Power:' in The Existence and N(l/Ilre o/God. ed. Alfred J. Frcddo50 (Not re Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 8t -1 13; Edward R. Wierenga. Tlte Ntj·
lure o/God: An /Ilquiry infO Divine Attributes (It haca: Cornet t University Press.
1989). 12-35; and Swinburne. The Coheren ce 0/ Theism, 153-66.
41 Some have gone so far as Co suggest not merely that God cremes the
material world. but also all logical truths. For ellample. some evangelicals arfirm
the proposition that God created fhe meaning o/Ihe word "create." However, t his
dcfinition of omnipotence is clearly overblown and meaning less. for the ve ry
assertion that "God creates logic:lltruths. including the meaning of what it is to
create" is ci rcul:lL This notion of omnipotence clearly presupposes that God
creates had some meaning before God created it. But this view also assumes t hat
God crCalex could not h:lve meaning until God created the meaning of /0 erell/I'.
This view therefore involves a vicious circularity that thereby renders the con·
cep. incoherent.
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Both Robinson and Blomberg object to the view that God
changes . However, since both repeatedly claim that God changes
in some respects, further clarification is needed. Here, a distinction
between the Godhead and individual divine persons is essential to
allow a coherent discussion. Lauer-day Saints can and should
agree that the Godhead does not change with respect to the essential attributes of godhood . The set of essential properties to be
con sidered divine does not change; the attributes of godhood are
therefore immutable. 42 In this sense, God is absolutely unchan ging. However, it does not follow that the individual divine persons
therefore do not change with respect to possess ion of the properties of godhood. If the Word was God and became human at some
point in time, then ce rtainly it is appropriate to refer to God as
"c hangeable," at least in the sense of "God " that refers to the
divine persons. In fact, it would be hard to conceive of a greater
change within the realm of logical possibility. Although God, used
in the sense of the Godhead, is always the same God, always unchangeable in divine power, knowledge, and goodness, the same is
not true of the individual divine persons who can change by condescending to empty themse lves of their ability to ex.ercise the
divine power and knowledge and taking on themselves all the essential limitations to which humans are heir. Even in evangelical
thought , the Son of God changed radically by taking on himself a
human nature-a nature that Blomberg admits was not present in
the Godhead hefore the incarnation . Would Bl omberg argue that
God is th erefore "finite" as conceived by evangelicals?
Nevertheless, I agree with Robinson that referring to the Mormon God as "finite" can be mi sleading if not carefully defined
and does not do just ice to the majesty and glory of God desc ribed
in sc ripture. It has all the wrong associations and cultural baggage.
The God who created the universe by brin ging a cosmos out of
42 1 take thi s to be the meaning of the various scriptures which assert (hal
God (i.e., (he Godhead) is the same unchangeable being from eternity to alt eternity (compare Moroni 8:18). As found in Lecture 3 of the Lectures on Faitb. it is
essential for any rational being to exercise faith in God as one Godhead to be·
lieve that God "does not change. neither does he vary; but he is the same from
everlasting to everlasting. being the same yesterday. today, and ror ever; and
his course is one eternal rou nd, without variation." Lecture 3, paragraph 15, in
Larry E. Dahl and Charles D. Tate Jr.. The LeClllres on Failh in Hislorical
Persl'eclil'e (Provo, Utah: BYU Religious Studies Center, 1990),68.
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chaos and who sustains its order and natural laws should not be
referred to as "limited in power." The God who knows the

chemical makeup of every molecule and the atomic weight of
every atom on everyone of the infinite number of stars in the
vastness of infinite space and yet knows the intimate thoughts of
our hearts should not be referred to as "limited in knowledge."
Surely such a being has knowledge and power so vast and great
that we cannot comprehend it. Referring to God as "finite" simply does not do justice to the awe and worship that is proper toward God. I agree with Robinson that we should not speak of a
finite God. Mormon philosophers, including myself. have not
been as sensitive as we ought to have been about the connotative
power of the word finite instead of merely insisting on its denotative meaning. I now reject the term finite as adequate to express
the Latter-day Saint view of God. I prefer a phrase such as maximally great to describe God, rather than absolute or finite.
Still, it is important to keep straight that when Latter-day
Saints use terms such as omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and omnipresent, they mean something different than the same terms in
classical theology. Indeed, these same terms mean something different for Arminians than for Calvinists. Robinson acknowledges
this with respect to terms such as finite, changing. and limited, but
seems to insist that the "omni" atlribules are somehow univocal
for both Mormons and evangelicals. This position can only lead
to confusion and further charges that Latter-day Saints are somehow not being up-front.

Blomberg on God
Blomberg admits that God is not "eternal," "changeless," or
"omniscient" in the sense most often used by Calvinists and other
classical theologians. He says that God is omniscient, but he also
teaches, correctly in my view, that in the incarnation God learned
something genuinely new in the sense that he gained experiential
knowledge of what it is to be human-a knowledge that he lacked
before the incarnation. As Blomberg asserts:
There is a kind of perfection that comes only through
experience. Prior to the incarnation. no member of the
Godhead had ever experienced the limitations of a

BLOMBERG, ROBINSON, HOW WIDE? (OSTLER)

\4\

bodily nature; therefore, Jesus truly had to grow and
had to learn what it was like to be human . We acknowledge that the early Church, with its infusion of Gree k
and Roman ideas, at times lost sight of the more
"dy namic" concept of God that the Hebrews had bequeathed to Christianity (p. 103. emphasis added).
One cannot avoid the concl usion that although God was
"omniscient," there wa<; knowledge that the Godhead and individu al di vine persons did not possess before the incarnation, and
cou ld nOI possess because such knowledge can only be ga ined by
ex perience. In addition, one cannot avoid the implication that God
(both as a Trinity and as a di vine person) changed at the time o f
the incarnation and that God is therefore temporal and not timeless as the classical tradition would have il. I think that what Blombe rg has to say here is a genuine insight and very valuable for ou r
contemplations about God-for both Mormons and evangel icals.
Th is all makes perfect sense in interpreting what the scriptures
say about the humanity and divinity of Jesus. But if Blomberg is
right, then God's intrinsic properties underwent change through
the incarnation. Thus God is not changeless or immutable in the
classical sense that none of his intrinsic properties can chan ge.
Furt her, God is not eterna l in the sense of "t imelessness," lack ing
all temporal succession, for there was a time before God had this
experiential knowledge and a time after he gained it. Blomberg is
carefu l to exp lain that when he speaks of God as changeless, he
means that God is faithful in keeping his word. It does not mean
that "God cannot be affected by our prayers or that the nature of
event s in this world cannot genuinely change as a result of th ose
prayers" (p. 102. emphas is added). Blomberg also rejects the
AugustinianfThomistic doctrine of impassibility, or the doctrine
that nothing acts upon God so that all causal influences proceed
away from God as First Cause and never toward God: "Mos t
Evangel icals agree that the old Greek and Latin emphases on 'impassibility' led to misconceptions about God's not having emotions" (p. 103).
But can Blomberg cons istently maintain that God was omniscient before the incarnation if he lacked experiential knowledge?
Sure he can, if omnisc ience is understood as " kn ow ledge of all
things thai it is possible fo r a being having the attributes of God 10
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know at Ihe lime in quc!i lion ." Because "God 's" auributes entail
that each of the three di vine persons ex ist in indwelling unil Y of
intimate love, il is imposs ible for God to experie nce al ienation,
isolation, abandonment, reject ion, and loneliness qua Godhead.
This knowledge could be gained only by leaving aside the unil y
a nd ex periencing the alienation inherent in mortality . This defin i-

tion is analogous to definitions of omnipotence that recognize that
God is not able to do absolutely anything. suc h as crealc a perfec tly round square, but onl y what it is log icall y poss ible for a
being having God's attributes 10 do at the lime in queslion. 43
All this shows that it is impossible to carryon a conversat io n
among M ormons and evangelicals without engaging in so me
"phi losophical prec isio n" and theo logy. Without being carefu l
about how we use the same terms coming from differen t theological trad itions, we merely speak past each other. Further. wit hout
accepting so me common standard of logic and what counts as a
reasonable position, we have no way of assessing the various assertio ns made. It seems to me that philosophical prec ision is no t
the problem Ro binson makes it out to be. 44 Care and accuracy in
di Sl,;uss iOIl an: virtues, no t vices. The probkm comes when devolio n to prior philosophical paradigms or re ligio us dogmas blocks
acceptance of new revelat ion or leads to the commitment to two
incompatible tradition s of reli gious beliefs.
It is hard to wed the dynamic and living God o f Hebrew
thought with the static and impersonal absolute of Greek phil osophy as classical Christians have atte mpted to do . But Blomberg
admits as much (see p. 103). Unfo rtunately, the creeds to which
Blomberg seems committed (des pite the ir less-authoritative status)
assume the absolutist parad igms of Greek philosophy. The twonature theory of Chri st that Blo mberg promotes is a result of attempts to expla in how God can be impassible, immutable. timeless.
and o mniscient in the absolutist sense that Blomberg obviously
43 This definition of omniscience is similar to the one provided by
William Ilasker in God. Time. and Know/edge (llhaca: Cornell University Press.
]989). 74. and Swinburne. in Tire Co/rerence of Tlreism. 177- 83.
44 Robinson lamen!s: "II has been my eKperience thaI when theologians
want precise definitions for biblical terms and concepls. they go not to the Bible
but philosophy" (p. 89), However. he ad mits that "bibl ical language is inadequate for defining ac tual orthodo~ belief aboul the nature of Goo" (p, 137),
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rejects. Why stick with the solution if you solve the problem by
rejecting the assumptions from Greek philosophy, particularl y
Middle Platonism, that created the problem in the first place? By
rejecting the absolutist metaphysic that creedal Christianity inher·
ited from Greek philosophy and fully e mbracin g the personal and
dynamic God of Hebrew revelation, Mormonism has avoided th e
logical probl em created by embracing two diametricall y opposed
views.

Blomberg on the Incarnation
I thought that Blomberg's statements regarding the incarna·
tion and the trinity were intelligent. However, Blomberg's accep·
tance of the so-called "incommunicab le" attributes of God leads
to an incoherent view of the fully human and fully di vine Jesus
Christ. Blomberg maintains that the so-called metaphy sical at·
tributes of God (show me that tenn in the Bible!) are not communicable to humans, including omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, eternality (uncreated), and immateriality (see p. 96). He
adds that God alone is "u ncau sed Being" and "alone is worthy
of worshi p" (p.97).
The logical proble m that this creates for Christology (the ex.·
planation of how Jesus is both God and man) is easily defined: the
essential properties of "God" appear to be incompatible with the
essent ial properties of humans. The most basic law of logic, the
law of noncontradiction, is thus to be violated by Blomberg's assertion that Jesus was both fully God, and thus Creator, and also
fully human and thus creature. The law of noncontradic tion asserts that no thing can be characterized simultaneously by a prope rty and its complement (negati on) in the same respects---or the
claim that the thing both has and does not have the property in
quest ion. For ex.ample, it is not possible for a thing to be both red
and also noncolored at the same time, or both taller and shorte r
than Socrates in the same respects. Now let's list the metaph ys ica l
attributes of God and those of humans:
Essential Attributes of God
I . Uncaused Bein g or on tolog icall y necessary
2. Incorporeal (immaterial)

Essential Properties of Humans
1'. Created or ontologically
co ntingent
2'. Corporeal (material)
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3. Omniscient
4. Omnipotent
5. Omnipresent
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3', Not omniscient
4', Not omnipotent
5', Not omnipresent

To allow this discussion to proceed, some clarifications are
necessary. A nonessential property is one that a thing can fail to
have and still be what it is. For example, a dog could fail 10 have
the property of "having hair" (say, for example, it gets shaved
bald) and still be a dog; but it couldn't fail to have canine chromosomes and still be a dog. "Having canine chromosomes" is
thus an essential property a thing must have in order to be a dog
and "having hair" is a nonessential propeny . A nature of a kind
includes all those properties essential for anything to be a member
of a kind. Thus all reptiles are cold-blooded. If an animal does
not have the property of being cold~blooded, then it does not be~
long to the natural kind reptile.
Blomberg's Christology is incoherent because it asserts both
that Christ was very God. having essential properties I through 5.
and also that Christ was fully human, thus having the complements
of these properties I' through 5'. The problem is that Blomberg
implicitly asserts that the properties of divinity are incompatible
with being human and vice versa-they are not compossibly exemplified in the same individual-for they are "incommunicable" to humans. If properties I through 5 are essential properties belonging to the kind deity or divine person or God, and if
properties I' through 5' are essential to the kind human, then the
law of noncontradiction is clearly violated. It is no wonder that
John Hick regards the doctrine that Christ was both "very God
and very man" to be as "devoid of meaning as to say that a circle
.. is also a square."45 Certainly Christians hope for more than a
45 John Hick. ed., The Myth of God Incarnate (London: SCM , 1977). 178.
Hick's position is not that no coherent view of incarnation eKists, but only that
"to say. without eKplanation, that the historical Jesus of Nazareth was also God
is as devoid of meaning as to say that this circle drawn with a pencil of paper is
also a square." However. Hick argues that no doctrine of incarnation can be
reconciled with what we know from biblical criticism (i.e., that the historical
Jesus of Nazareth did not claim to be God or an incarnation of God the Son) and
also provide a suitable candidate for ''God'' as traditionally understood. See his
The Metaphor of God Incarnate (Louisville: KnoK, 1993). 3, in which Hick
critiques both the two-nalUre Chrislology of Cha1cedon (along with its modem
"two minds" interpretation) and also of kenotic Christologies. See chaps. 5-7.
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central and defining belief that either cannot be given any meaning or that , when carefu ll y elucidated. can be shown to be positively incoherent.
Blomberg asserts that : "If Christ was ever less than fully God
(even when he assumed a human nature), then he is by defi nilion not the kind of infinite deity necessary to atone for s ins "
(pp. 117- 18). But if Jesus was not omnisc ien t, omnipotent, and
immaterial even while lying in the manger, then how can he be
simultaneously fully God? It is clear that Blomberg accepts the
traditional response to this question : he accepts the tWo-nature
theory of Christology promulgated in the Chalcedoni an creed in
451 A.D. (see p. 112). Blomberg claims: "We do not argue Ihal
Jesus was simultaneously incarnate and omniprese nt. Instead, we
claim that there was more to God than Jesus ... . Jesus had a fully
di vi ne nature. inseparable from the Father' s divine and essentially
immate rial nature" (p. 99). No one di sputes that there is more to
the Godhead than Jesus (for there are also the Father and Hol y
Ghost); the problem is that Blomberg has not set it forth it acc urate ly. Jesus does not fully embody even God the Son. the second
person of the Trinity. in this view. Just what is claimed in the twonature theory of Ch ristology that is the mainstay of CatholicfProtestant thought? This theory asserts the following: ( I ) "C hri st" is
ide ntified with a single per.son; (2) this single per.son possessed
both fully human and fully divine nalures; and (3) these two natures are simultaneously present in one per.son.46

46 See David Brown. Tile Divine Trini/)' (La Salle: Open Court. 1985).
228. According 10 the Counci l of Chatcedon. found in Henry Bcnenson. cd ..
DOCl/men/s of the ChriS/ion Church. 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford Uni versity.
(963). 73 :
[Jesus Christ is 1 at once complete in Godhead and comptele in manhood. truly God and truly man. consisting also of a reasonable soul and
body; or one substance (ho moousios) with the Father as regards hi s
Godhead. and al the same time of one substance with us as regards his
manhood; like us in all respects. apart from sin .
one and the same
Christ. Son, Lord. Only-begotten. recognized ill two narures, without
confusion. wilhoUl change, wi/hour division, withom separarion: the
distinction of natures being in no way annulled by the union. but rather
the characteristics of each nature being preservcd and coming together
to form one person and subsistence.
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The concepts promulgated in the ChaJcedonian creed are very
diffieu!! to convey to the modern layman, including concepts of
Qusia or substance, phusis or nature, and an extremely equivocal
notion of hypostasis or person. However, I take the term 110moousious ("of the same substance") to refer to possession of the
essential, generic properties held in common between two entities
that belong to the same kind-that is, sharing the same nature.
The Father and the Son are said to be homoousious or to share the
same divine nature. I take the term ousia or substance in the affirmation that Christ is "of one substance with the Father as regards his Godhead ... land] of one substance with us as regards
his manhood" to mean that Christ has all the essential properties
both of God and of humans.
So how is this supposed to solve the problem? Christ is supposed to be omniscient, omnipotent, and so forth, only in his divine nature as God, and supposed, on the other hand, to be nonomniscient. nonomnipotent and so forth, only in his human nature
as man. But how can both of these logically incompatible natures
be contained in the babe lying in the manger? The divine nature
of God the Son is also "in heaven" so to speak, while Jesus is on
earth. Doesn't that give us two separate entities. one divine and
one human, and not one person as asserted at ChaJcedon? Well,
supposedly not, because that is the Nestorian heresy thaI divides
the person of Christ into two separate beings. The Council of
Chalcedon rejected that view. The divine nature is not separate
from the human nature-at least. that is what Chalcedon asserted.
The divine nature contains the human nature, but the human nature does not fully contain the divine nature. Further. a thing can
have a property and its negation if it has them in different respects. For example, as a mortal I can die; as an immortal spirit I
cannot die. The logic of ChaJcedon is supposed to work in an
analogous way: as God, Christ is omniscient. omnipotent, immaterial. and so forth. and as human, Christ is nOI omniscient, omnipotent, incarnate, and so forth. 47
47 This type of proposition is known as a reduplicative proposition because it recasts the property in negation in different aspects of the same singular
term. This strategy has been worked out by R. T. Herbert. Parooox and Identity in
Theology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1979). 88; and Peter Geach, Provi·
dena and Evil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1977),25-28.
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However, this strategy will not work if the property is possessed by the entire person rather than just by some aspect of that
person. For example, as a Caucasian I am light skinned but dark
haired . I am thus both light and dark, but in different respects. It
would be a contradiction on ly if 1 were said to be light and dark in
the same respects, or wi th respect to my en tire person. However, I
am a human being with respect to my enti re person and not just in
some aspect of my person. It is thus inconsistent to say that I am a
hu man being but I also have a property that no hu man being can
have. such as being uncreated. The two-natu re theory is ult imately
incoherent because the entire person of Christ is essentiall y uncreated (ontologically necessary) as God whereas humans are necessarily created (ontolog ically co n tinge n t)~at least in Blomberg's
view. 48 Blomberg's Christology th us impl icitly violates the law of
noncontrad iction. Nothi ng can be both created and uncreated in
the same respects.
Further, the two- nature theory contrad icts both the Bible and
common sense because it multiplies entities to make sense of the
incompat ible " nat ures." The title ChrislOS in the Chalcedon ian
creed is used as a personal name for the indi vidual "pe rso n" who
is both hu man and divine. However, this indiv idual "person"
cannot be identical to the historical Jesus of Nazareth. An object
48 Blomberg explai ns: '·If [Latter-day Saints] mean that humans can take
on God's being and God's incommunicable attributes . . . then we demu r, claim·
ing that [Latter-day SaintsJ have not adequately preserved the distinction in essence between the creature and Creator" (p. 107). Blomberg thus insists that
humans must be created whereas Oed is unereated. Thomas Morris has suggested
that perhaps it is not an essential property of humans to be created. but merely a
common property. He asserts: ··If contingcncy. coming into cxistencc, and possibly ceasing to exist were essential human properties. the doctrine of the Incarnation would express a metaphysical, or broadly logical. impossibility. But I
can think of no compctling argument, or any other type of good reason. to thi nk
they are clements of human nature." Morris continucs: ··Only a very few contemporary theologians who have written on the topic {of Christology) seem to have
recognized that we can understand human nature in such a way that it can be
cocxemplified wi th divinity in one and the same subject." Thomas V. Morris.
Tire Logic of God InCarfI(J.l~ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1986). 65. This is
a remarkable statement for a creedal Christian to make, for it allows that huma ns
could be uncreuled and sti ll be human. However, Blomberg seems to be unwilling
to countenance such a possibi lity. for that would make human existence "uncaused." and he reserves that attribute for God.
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x is identical [0 an object y onl y if every prope rty possessed by x
is also possessed by y and vice versa. 49 But clearly the "pe rso n "
Christ referred to in the creed is nol identical to the human "person" know n as Jesus, because the Ch rist of the creed possesses a
range of properties nol possessed by Jesus of Nazareth. that is, all
lhose properties I through 5 possessed essentially by God bUI nOI
by any human being. Furt her. the "person" of Christ referred to
in the creed is not ident ical with God the Son, the second "pe rson" of the Trinity, because thi s creedal Christ possesses prope rties I ' through 5', which are possessed by hu mans but not by di vine persons. The "perso n" referred to in the two-nature theory
must therefore be understood as yet a third " perso n" that is not
ide ntical to e ither the person Jesus or the second "perso n" of the
Trinity, the Son. Rather, the " pe rson" spoken of in the c reeds
incl udes both of these "persons," a hu man person identical with
Jesus and a divine person iden tica l wi th " the Son," the second
person of the Tri nity. In conclus ion, there is a "pe rson" Jesus, a
"perso n" who is the second person of the Trinity. and a third
"pe rson" who includes both of these other ·'persons."
Nume rous problems ari se with thi s theory. Because humanity
is log icall y incompatible wi th divinity in this view, it is not poss ible
for them 10 ex ist wit hin the same person. Second. these ideas are
not scriptural and indeed contradic t the sc riptures. Accord ingly ,
one cou ld not assert, as the New Testament does, that when a person spoke with God the Son, he was speak ing to Jesus. T he twonature theory contradicts the Ch ri stian claim that "Jesus is God,"
fo r Jesus was not identical to the divine nature and coul d not be
div ine. But if "the Word was God" (see John 1: 1), and ' the Word
was made fl esh" (see John 1: 14) as Jesus of Nazareth. then how
can we avoid the concl usion that Jesus was identical to the divine
Word in a ll his essential properties as an ind ividual? Most important ly, the creed affirms that it was not the divine nature of Chri st
that suffered in the atonemen t, but so lely the human nature. According to thi s theory, the div ine nature was never made nesh. The
divine nature never died. The divine nature did not learn from the
49 T his principle. known as the identity of indiscernability. is presented
here more simply than in precise philosophical discussions. More properly. the
principle is: for any x and any y and any property P. if x is identical to y (x ::: y).
then x has P if and only if y has P.
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things it suffered. Following Blomberg's logic, the atonement
cou ld not be accomplished because it wa'i not wrought by the d ivine nature (see p. 11 8).
By now it should be clear why Latter-day Saints reject th e
creedal two- nature Christo logy: it is unbiblical and contradictory.
Now here does the Bible assert thai the Son, the second person o f
the Godhead, the divi ne Word, remained a separate and distinct
nature from Jesus' humanity. It says that the Word was God and
that the Word became fl esh as Jesus of Nazareth . The two- nature
theory of Chrislology adopted by Blomberg is a concocti on
brewed by peop le who had imbibed too much Middle Platonism.50

50 For an e:'tcellcnt discussion of the pervasive innuencc of Greek philosophy on Christian thought that is available to the layperson, sec John Sande rs, " Historical Considerations." in The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge
10 the TradiliOfI(Jl Understanding of God, ed. Clark Pinnock et al. (Downers
Grove. ilL: InterVarsity. 1994).59- 100. I believe that Maurice Wiles is correct
in his conclusion that the panieular views adopted by Christians at Nicea and
Chalcedon were not identical to any existing school of philosophy; howeve r.
the presuppositions of Neoplatonism and Middtc Plato nism provided the assu mptions from which the entire debate commenced. Thus. although the nonbiblical notion of ousia or substance utili zed at Chalccdon derived from Aristotle. the interpretation of the term was novel and not entirely derived from
Aristotle. However. all panicipants in the councils (on both sides of the Arian
controversy) assumed the Platonic distinction between the ti me less, c hangeless,
and impersonal ideal forms and the lesser reality of the phenomenal world. Thus
Christian theologians assumed that God is immutable. timeless. impassible. and
ineorporeal~giving God the same propenies as the Platonic ideas or forms. The
absolu tist understanding of God that developed fro m this Neoplatonic worldview
led inevitably to the doctrine of cremio ex nihi/o:
But increaSingly the stress came 10 be laid on the absolu teness of God's
creative work as creation out of nothing {and eventually to the twO
natures Christology. 1 The great divide was not between the spiritual
realm (God. the Word. angels. human souls) and the phenomenal; it was
between God and the created order. between God and everything else.
The tension always inherent in Christian understanding of the Son was
being stretched to breaki ng !'Oint. How in such an altered framework
was the person of the Son 10 be understood? (Maurice Wiles, "The
Philosophy in Christianity: Arius and Athanasius." in The Philosophy
in ChriSlianily, cd. Godfrey Vesey ICambridge: Cambridge Unive rsity
Press. 1989j, 47)

150

FARMS REVIEW OF BOOKS 1 In ( 1999)

Robinson's Implicit Christology
Robinson does not e lucidate a Chrislology. He simpl y asserts
that " if the di vine can become fully human and then as human be
rai sed up again to be full y God (Phil 2:6--1 I) , then it is establi shed
that what is fully human may also be divine" (p.8 3). Because in
M ormon thought humans and divine persons arc of the sa me kind,
the same species , it is no contradicti on to think of divinity a.<; full y
mature humanity. Nevertheless, it is clear from Robinson 's assumptions about di vinity ari sing from complete unity that he has
constructed an implicit kenotic Christology. Thi s view takes its
name from the Greek word kenosis, which means "emptin ess ."
The term appears only in Philippians 2:6-11 , c ited by Ro bin so n.
11 reports that Christ " though he was in the form of God , did no t
count equality with God a thing 10 be grasped, but e mptied him self {the Greek verb here is a form of the word kenosisJ, takin g the
form of a servant, being born in the likeness of me n" (RSY). Th e
notion is that the pree xistent Christ emptied himself of divine
properties to become like human s.
The notio n of the preexiste nt Christ thro ughout the gospe l o f
John also assumes this view. For example, in John 17:4-5 Jesus
prays: " I glorified thee on the earth , having accompli shed th e
work which th ou gavest me to do ; and now, Father, g lorify thou
me in thy own presence with the glory which J had with thee befo re the world was made" (RSV). Stephen T. Davis points out that
at least three claims are implicit in thi s sc ripture: (\) "Jesus Ch ri st
once had divine glory and complete oneness with the Fath e r"
bef ore the world existed; (2) during his mortal mini stry Jesus " did
nOI possess the fulln ess of di vine glory"; and (3) Jesus antic ipated
regaining the full unity and glory that he once had with th e
Father.51 Exactl y these same cla ims are made in the Doctrine and
Platonic ass um ptions led the early Christian fathers dow n the wro ng p;lth,
rep laci ng the dyna mic and personal God of the biblical revelations wi th the
im personal absolutes of Gree k metap hysics.
51 Stephe n T. Davis. Encountering )1'5145: A Debate O f l Chri5 t% KY
(Atlan ta: K no ~ , 1988). 52-53. Davis does a good joh of elucidati ng a ke no tic
C hristo logy from an evangelical perspecti ve. Kenotic Christo logy has also
heen elucidated and defended by Gottfried Thomasius, "C hrist' s Person and
Work." in God (Jlllf Incarnation in M id·Ninelel:'nth Ceflmry Gerlllllfl Theology.
trans. and ed. Claude Welch (New York: O~ford UniverSity Press, 1965), 37-94:
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Covenants: "A nd thus he was called the Son of God, because he
received not of the fulness at the first. ... And I , John , bear record
that he received a fuln ess of the glory of the Father; And he re~
ceived all power, both in heaven and on earth , and the glory of the
Father was with him , for he dwelt in him" (D&C 93:14,16--17).
Robinson 's Christology thus foll ows from the recog nition that
divinity arises from the indwelling unity of the divine persons. It
follows that if the di vine unity of the Godhead is voluntarily sev~
ered, as occ urred when Chri st vo luntaril y "condescended" to become human. then Christ no longer possesses the properties of
divin ity that ari se on ly from being in this relationship . Thus Christ
"empti ed himself' of his di vinity and became human . However,
he rega ined hi s divine glory by perfectly doing the will of the
Father, became one with him again, and was exalted to divinity.
Humans become di vi ne in the same way that Ch ri st did- by be~
coming one with the Father. Moreover, Mormon scriptures take
Chri st more seriou sly as a revealer of both human and divine na ~
tu re than does the two-nature Chri stology. Jesus Chri st revealed to
us the di vine nature by being made fl esh and by being glorified
by the Father as a resurrected being. But he also reveals the true
human natu re and its divine origin and potential. Rather than trying to unify two di sparate natures, Christ has demonstrated that
human nature can be glorified and made divine. Doctrine and
Covenants 93 makes the deification of humans exact ly parallel to
Christ's, so that we may share fully as heirs of all that Chri st is just
as he shared fu lly in all that we are as humans:
The Son
I was in the beginning with the
Father (D&C 93:2 1).
I . .. am the Firstborn (D&C
93:2 1).

Human Beings
Ye were al so in the beg inning
with the Father (D&C 93:23).
All those who are begotten
through me are partakers of the

Stephe n T. Davis, Logic and tire Nmure 0/ God (Crand Rapids, Mich.: Ecrdmans.
t 983): Brown. TIre Divine Triniry: and Morris, Tire Logic of God Incanwre.
88-102: Brian Hebblcthwaite. The Incamarion: Cailecud Essays in Chrislology
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Frank Weston. The One Christ:
An Enquiry inlO Ihe Manner 0/ Ihe Incarnation, 2nd edt (London: Longmans.
Grcen. 1914): Stephen W. Sykes, '1'he Strange Persistence of Kenotic Christology," in ileing and Trulh: Essays in Honour of 101m MacqUllrrie. edt Alistair Kcc
Long and Eugene T. Long (London: SCM_ 1986)_ 349-75.
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glory of (the FirstbornJ, and are
the church of the Firstborn.
(D&C 93:22).
And he received not of the fulness at first, but continued from
grace to grace, until he received
a fulness (D&C 93: 13).

If you keep my commandments you sha ll receive of his
fulness, and be glorified in me
as I am in the Father; ... You
shall receive grace for grace
(D&C 93:20).

lI] received a fulness of the
glory of the Father (D&C
93: 16).

You may come unto the Father
in my name and in due time
receive of his fulness (D&C
93: 19).

He received a fulness of truth,
yea, even all truth (D&C
93:26).

He that keepeth hi s commandments receiveth truth and light,
until he is glorified in truth and
knoweth all things (D&C
93:28).

He received all power, both in
heaven and on eart h (D&C
93: 17).

[Those who are ordained possess} all things; for all things
are subject unto him (D&C
50:27).

Robinson is thus quite correct to base his view of deity on the
indwelling unity of the Godhead for both Christ and humans. His
view seems to me compatible with the primary thrust of the Mormon scriptures on this pain!. The kenolic view can be coherent
on ly if human beings can be uncreated like God the Son; for if it
is an essential property of humans to be onlologicall y contingent
or created, then it would be inconsistent to say that the divine
Word was made fully human in Jesus of Nazareth. If humans must
be onlologically cont ingent, as Blomberg asserts, then contradictory properties would be asserted of the same person. There is
thus a logical consistenc y demonstrated in the revelati on presented
in Doctrine and Covenants 93, which states that humans are uncreated: "Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelli gence,
or the li ght of truth , was not created or made, neither indeed can
be" (D&C 93:29). This Christology is not only logically cons istent, it is fully scriptural.
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However, Blomberg raises a serious problem with kenotic
Christology. If Jesus was not divine at the time of atonement, then
it seems that the atonement could not be effected; for no mere
human cou ld atone for the sin s of others (see p. 117- 18). Unlike
Robinson, I believe that Blomberg has a point here, for the scrip·
tures affirm that only a divine being can atone for the si ns of
others. Robinson believes that the scri ptures show that Christ, as a
mortal, accomplished the atonement, so it must be possible.
Robinson claims, "it was clearly the mortal Jesus Christ, in his
subordinate state (or 'lower position' or 'state of humiliation')
before his ascension and glorification, who suffered for us, bled
for us, atoned for us, redeemed us, and died for us" (p. 131 ).
However, I don't think that Robinson has fully appreciated the
implications of his own position, for he correctly affirms that
Mormon scriptures also insist that only a Christ who is "full y
God" could accomplish the atonement (pp. 134-35; see Mosiah
15: 1-5; Alma 34:9-14; 42:23-25). The logic of his own position
entails that Jesus is not divine unless he is one "in" the Father.
Therefore, Robinson is logically stuck with the view that Jesus was
one "in" the Father at the lime of alonement. However, :1.<; a hu man who shares our alienation and separation from the Father, it
would appear that Robinson's implicit Christology logicall y en tails that Jesus was human and not divine at the time of effecting
the atonement. Robinson needs an ex.planation of how the mortal
Jesus was fully one in the Father and divine at that time-but he
offers none .
I want to suggest here at least two possible responses to Blomberg's challenge. First, Latter-day Saint scripture emphasizes that
Christ mu st be morally perfect to atone for the sins of others (see
Alma 34:9-17; 42). Christ was a perfect sacrifice because he
freely remained without s in-he was morally perfect. Thus perhaps the only divine property that had to be fully actual and
manifest in the person of Jesus to effect the atonement was moral
perfection. The other essential properties of divinity, such as
omnipotence, omniscience, and so forth, need not be fully actual,
but only potentially possessed, for purposes of accomplishing the
atonement. Thus the essential divine property relevant to atonement is not possession of omnipotence per se, but omnipotentIlnle.u-volu.marily-emptied; not omniscience per se, but omni·
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sciem- un less-vo[llntarily-emptied, and so forth.52 Of course, some
of the so-called essential properties of divinity listed by Blomberg
would be rejected by Latter-day Saints. It is nOI essential thai the
Son be incorporeailo be divine. Further. Mormons would reject as
essential to humans the property of having been created. in their
essence, or of being ontologically con tingent . Being created or
being uncreated arc nOI properties that can be "e mpti ed" or set
aside temporarily . Thus in kellosis Christ emptied himse lf of those
divine properties that are not possibly exemplified at the same
time with human nature and he retained those which are. However,
in so emptying himself he retained all properti es essent ial to be
fully God. He was thu s "fu lly God and full y human" at the time
of atonement. For Mormonism, humanity and deity are not
incompatibl e.
Second, one could maintain that at the time the atonement was
accomplished in the garden, the Father gave Jesus that glory he
possessed with the Father before the world was, as reflected in th e
High Priestly Prayer of Joh n 17. At the beginning of the prayer,
Christ prays: "0 Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with
the glory which I had wilh thee before the world was" (John
17:5). At the end of the prayer, Christ recognizes that God had in
fact already glorified him by being in him and becoming one
with him : "Father, I will that they also, whom thou has given me,
be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which
thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of
the world" (John 17:24, emphasis added). Thus durin g the prayer
in Gethsemane, Christ was glorified with the glory of the Father
and became full y divine,for he dwelt in him. His prayer for co m·
plete unity was answered. Therefore, at the time the atonement wa~
accomplished, Jesus had all the properties of di vinity, includin g a
relationship of indwelling unity. These are only two scriptural
possibilities to respond to the problem raised by Blomberg.

52 Thi s suggestion 10 reconcepluulize Ihe essential divine properties was
made by Morris, The Logic 0/ God Incarnate, 99-100. Feenstra. " Reconsidering
Kenotie Christology," 140-41 , also adopts this poSitio n. and t have modified
the di vine properties along the lines he suggests.
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Blomberg and Robinson on the Trinity
Blomberg does not present his notion of the Trinity succ inctly
enough to permit a clear idea of just how close the Father and Son
are in the Godhead. However, he clearl y prefers a view which, he
believes, retains something like Hebrew monotheism as much as
possib le whi le also keeping the distinction between the Father and
the Son (see pp. 123- 24). He is emphat ic that Latter-day Saints
have separated the Father and the Son too much to meet this requ irement, by giv ing each of them a glorified body (see p. 12 1).
However, it seems to me that the Father and the Son are more
radically separated in Blomberg's view than he appears willing to
admit. Cons ider that the Son. in Blomberg'S view, possesses a disparate human nature that is not possessed by the Father. The Son
took on himself flesh, but God the Father is somehow "essentially
immaterial" and thus could not take on himself a material body
(p. 99). The Son has gained experiential kn owledge persona ll y
whi le the Father cannot have such first-person experiential knowledge. The Son is functionally subordinate to the Father. The Son
"issues" from the Father. but the Father is essentially unoriginated and uncaused. In Blomberg's view, the Son thus has a nature and capac ities that the Father not only lacks. but can never
have. How is this supposed to maintain an identity between Father
and Son compat ible with Hebrew monotheism?
Moreover, I doubt that any person who accepts the Trinity, at
least one who is not also a modalist (one divine be ing manifest in
three modes), can in integrity claim to be a monotheist as understood by the Hebrew prophets. For the Hebrew prophets there was
a single divine person, Yahweh, not three-at least so far as we can
discern from the Bible alone. Moreover, thi s one divine person
was thought to be a person in the fullest sense of the word as an
intelligent, purposive center of consciousness having a distinct
cognitive and conat ive personality. The Hebrews did not use the
term persona as it was used in the Latin Ch urch to mean a mere
mask or different roles played by the same perso n.53 Nor did
they acknowledge distinct perSOnJ within the one God. The claim
53 For the various meanings of the Latin

and the Greek prosopOIl,
ed. (New York: Harper & Row,

persona

see J. N. D. Kell y, EClrly Chris/iall Doctrines. rev.
1978). 112- 15.
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to be a monotheist ill this sense and also to accept the Trinity as
elucidated in the creeds is logically impossible. Consider the
following :
1. There is only one divine person, Yahweh.
2. The Father is a divine person.
3. The Son is a divine person.
4. The Father is not identical to the Son.
The acceptance of any three of these premises entails the denial of the fourth. If only one divine person exists, and the Father
is a divine person and the Son is a divine person, then the Father
and the Son must be identical to each other and to Yahweh-bul
this option leads to the heresy of modal ism. Then the Son and the
Father would be merely different names or modes of the one divine person Yahweh. On the other hand, if the Father is a divine
person and the Son is a divine person, and the Falher is not identical to the Son, then more than one divine person exists. However,
the acceptance of more than one divine person entails the rejection of Hebrew monotheism, which accepts only one divine person. Alternatively, if only one divine person exists, and the Father
is a divine person, and the Father is not identical to the Son, then
the Son cannot be a di vine person. No Christian who accepts the
Trinity could accept that.
Unless we try to read the doctrine of the Trinity back into the
Hebrew texts (where, in my opinion, it is clearly not found), we
simp ly equivocate and mislead when we refer to the "one God"
of Hebrew monotheism as the "one God" of the Trinity.54
Moreover, the same is true even of the references to the "one
God" in the New Testament-the doctrine of the Trinity as defined in the later creeds simp ly docs not appear there unless it is
54 As John J. Collins commented in his review of the relation ship
between the Christian doctrine of the Trinity developed at Chaleedon and Jewish
monot heism, "Non·Christians, and many Christians who lack the appetite for
metaphysical reasoning, may be forgiven for thi nking that Ithe assertion that
the Son is iromOQUS;OIH with the Father] allows for some equivocation, enabling
Christianity to mai ntain contradictory IXlsitions without admitting it .... The
notion that God is three as well as one. however, obviously entai ls a consider·
able qualification of monotheism." "Jewish Monotheism and Christian Theol·
ogy:' in Aspecl$ of Monotireism: lIow God /s One, cd. Hershel Shanks and Jack
Meinhardt (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Archaeology Society. 1997). 104.
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read back into Bible by forcing the lext with later assumptions. At
this point the assumption of the doctrinal unity of all sc ripture
assumed by inerrancy looms large . It seems to me that Bl omberg
reads the text with this assumption in mind and thus requires the
Hebrew prophets to say something consistent not only with the
New Testament, but al so with later creedal pronouncements that
supposedly "merely summarize" biblical beliefs. However, I believe we should allow the Hebrew prophets, such as Isaiah , a diffe rent understanding from John or Paul, perhaps an understanding that cannot be reconciled without comprehending that we are
dealing with two disparate worlds of thought. The "one God" of
the Jew ish shema is nOl the "one God" of the creedal Trinity.
How did the earliest Christians converted from Judiasm resolve
the te nsion between Jewish monotheistic commitments and acceptance of Jesus as Lord, a divine person separate from the Father?
In One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient
Jewish Monotheism,55 Larry Hurtado co ncluded that the earliest
Chri stians appropriated the Jewish notion of divine agency to resolve the tension. He finds ev idence of the "d ivine agent" th eme
in a number of New Testament texts (see Acts 2:33-36; Romans
1:1-4; I Corinthians 8:1-6; 15:20-28; 1 Thessalonians 1:9- 10;
and Philippians 2:5- 11 ) and concludes that these texts demonstrate that:
( I) Jesus is exalted to a particular position , second onl y
[in authority] to the one God [the Father] . (2) In this
pos ition, he acts by divinely granted authority and as
God's principal agent in the execution of God's will.
(3) He is directly associated with the one God and like ned to him in certain ways (e.g ., he is given the
"name above every name") . . . . The Christian co ncept ion of the exaltation of Christ shows a concern fo r
the uniqueness and supremacy of the one God. just as
we found in the Jewish evidence dealing with chi ef
agents. 56

55 Larry W. Hunado, Olle God. One Lord: Early Christian Devotion
Allcielll Jewisll MonOlheism (Philadelphia: Fortress. 1988).

56 Ibid .. 99.

and
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This evidence shows that in the Pauline texIS, Christ was nOI
the "one God," but the chief agent of the one God. the Father.
MonOlheism was preserved by recognizing (he Father as the one
God of Jewish devotion and Christ as the Son who does the Fa·
ther's will, is sent by the Father. is given the name above all names
by the Father, gives all glory to the Father. and acts at the Father's
request. In Paul we see a clear distinction between the persons of
the Father and the Son. We also note a thoroughgoing subordina·
tion of the Son to the Father. Nevertheless. titles and devotion previously reserved for deity are given to Christ. Blomberg is correct:
The experience with and of Jesus shattered previous categories
and required rethinking the notion of divinity (see p. 115).
Cornelius Plantinga Jr. likewise reviewed the "Trinitarian"
texts in Paul's letters and reached a similar conclusion. Plantinga
explains:
We have in Paul one God, one Lord, and one Spirit. I
might add that Paul's habit of reserving the designator
God for the Father, and indicating the di vinity of th e
Son and Spirit in ways usually other than calling them
God straight out, is typical of the New Testament generally. This habit, combin ed with biblical characterizations of the Father as generator and sender, lies behind
a Christian trinitarian tradition, especially pronounced
in the Greek East, of regarding the Father as God
proper, as the source or font of the divinity of Son and
Spirit. The latter two may be fully divine, but they are
derivatively 50. 57
Plantinga notes that the Gospel of John and the epistles of
John and Hebrews are the other primary sources of the notion of
threeness/oneness in the New Testa ment. He argues conv incingl y
that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are united in "will, work,
word, and kn owledge among them, and by their reciprocal love
and glorifying. These same six phenomena both distingu ish the
three persons and also unite them, typically by a functi o nal sub ordination relation that obtains among the three."58 In John, th e
57 Cornelius Planti nga Jr., "Social Trinity and Tritheism:' in Trinity.
inC(lrllalion. and AlOnement, 25.
58 Ibid.
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Father send s the Son who does not his own will, but the will of the
Father who sends him. Th ough the Son has a will of his own, he
subordin ates it to his Father's, who is greater than he. In tum, the
Son sends the Parac1ete or Holy Gh ost to his disc iples as his agent
to comfort them aft er he leaves. The Spirit is thus subordinated to
the Father and the Son. Pl antinga concludes:
Yet this very superordinat ion and subordination of
wills that dist inguish the th ree persons also unite them.
For in fact onl y one d ivi ne wi ll is expressed- that of
the Father who sends the Son and who, with the Son,
sends the Paraclete. The sending idea itself, given the
~a li ( a ) l.l ["called and sent by Yah weh as prop het") tradition of the Old Testament and rabbinic Judaism, suggests both that "the one who sends is greater than the
one sent" and also that the one sent is an almost pe rfect duplicate or representati ve of the sender. 59
Nevertheless, we must never lose sight of the fact that in John
the Son is equall y div ine with the Father. If the Father is "the on ly
true God," the Son is also "God" (theos; John 1: 1 and 17 :3).
The Son is primord ially united as one " in " the Father. The Son
enjoyed the fuln ess of glory of the Father before the world was-a
ful ness wh ich he temporaril y set aside to become fl esh. Their
unity is so profound that the Father and Son are " in" each other.
However, as Robinson correctly points OUl, thi s un ity does not
obliterate the distinct persons of the Father and the Son, for the
disc iples are also to be one with the Son and each other just as the
Father and the Son are one "i n" one another.
Bl ombe rg insists that Latter-day Saints have gone too far:
"Historic Christianity has always insisted on ba lancing Christ ' s
functionaL subordination with his ontological equal ity. In ot her
word s, in the very essence of Christ's being he is eternally equal
with God, even if in playi ng certain roles he voluntaril y sub mits
himse lf to his Fath er" (p . 11 7). Thi s type of talk is vague. I 'm
not sure what Blomberg means hy "historic Christianity," but if it
includes the earliest Christians who wrote the New Testament, th en
hi s ins istence on "onto log ical equality" seems to me misdirected.
59 Ibid.. 26.
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I cannot find that word or even the concept anywhere in my Bible.

"O ntol ogy" is the category of Greek phil osophy par excel lence
which defines necessary and contingent ex istence. If Blomberg
merely means to assert that the Father and the Son have the same
type of existence onlo logically, so that both have always ex isted of

some Iype of log ical or factual necessity, then Lauer-day Saints
have liule to disagree with even if such concepts are entirely fore ign to the biblical writers. It is standard Mormon doctrine thai
both the Father and the Son have always ex isted as individuals and
CQuid nol fail to ex ist. In this sense, both the Father and the So n
have ontologically necessary existence in Mormon thought.
C learly, Blomberg can not mean to assert that the Father and
the Son have always existed as the same d ivi ne person or merely
different ro les of Yahweh, despite his ta lk about being eq ua l
("ident ica l"?) to one anot he r or "p lay ing roles" of the same
God, for thi s view would amount to modaii sm-w hich Blomberg
clearly rejects. 60 If Blomberg intends to assert merely that Christ
is equally God with the Father in the sense that both possess all
properties essential to be considered divine, then Latter-day Saints
can happily embrace thi s claim regarding "onto logica l eq uality."
Latter-day Saints can agree with the traditional claim th at th e Father and the Son have the "same essence"-in rhe sense rhat they
both have all essential properties of godhood. But si nce Blomberg
rejects the Mormon view, that cannot be what he means . It appears,
therefore, that Blomberg means something more. But if Blomberg
objects to the notion that C hrist is s ubordinate in the sense that he
is divine in dependence on hi s re lation to the Father. then Blomberg can on ly mean that C hri st is not dependent on his relation to
the Father for hi s divinity. What is left except the assertion that
C hri st would be divine ontoiogicall y independem of the Father?61
60 When Blomberg assens that the Father and the Son are the "same being," he docs not mean that they arc the same divine person: rather, he must be
understood to mean that they together constit ute the same being on a different
level of analysis. Otherwise, the heresy of modali~m follows.
61 Blomberg accepts that Christ is subordinated jimClianaU)' to the
Father-that is. that Christ does the Father's will and is sent by the Father as t he
Father's agent. However. he denies an onlOlogical subordination , meaning thaI
the Son is nOI in any way dependent on the Father for his existence or his divine
status. While Mo rmonism agrees that Christ exists or ontological necessity and
is not dependent on the Fathcr for his existence, it rejects the view that Christ is
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Not on ly is this doctrine cont rary to the New Testament, but it is
also incohere nt. When theologians begin to use the language of
Greek philosophy, espec ially in regard to onlology, they often fail
to see that they import notions of isolated ontological independence (represented prom inentl y by the classical doctrine of aseity)
that are foreign to the scriptural understanding of God. Robinson
is correct to assert that the Gospel of Joh n and the writings of Paul
teac h that Christ is God on ly in relation to the Father, for it is this
relation of unity that gives rise to the d ivine love and life. God is
essentially love, and in the absence of such love the very concept
of God has no meaning in Ch rist ianity. Robinson is correct to
poi nt out that Bl omberg's insistence on ontological equality in
lhis sense is dri ven not by the biblical record, but by Greek notions of perfection which in siSI that every divine property is identical to the divine essence (the doctrine of simplicity).62 Further,
an insistence on suc h ontological independence is inconsistent
with the doctrine of divine "oneness of being" that Blomberg
elucidates, for it entails that two divine persons could exist who are
on tologically independent of one another. Finally, the view that
Christ is o ntologicull y independent is inconsistent even with Chul-

cedon's creedal formu lae that "Chri st issued from" or that th e
Son is "ete rnally begotten by the Father," certainly pointin g to
some ki nd of relation of ontolog ical dependence of the Son on
the Father. 63

in no sense dependent on the Father for his divine status, for Christ coold not be
di vine independently of the Father.
62 Several persons have critiqoed the attempt to reconcile the doctrine of
the Trinity with the notio n of divine simplicity or the claim that God is not
composite in any sense but wholly without parts. See Christopher M. Hughes.
On a Complex Theory of (J Simple God: An Investigalion in Aquinas' Philosophical Theology ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Thomas V. Morris,
"Dependence and Divine Simplicity:' Internalional Journal/or rhe Philosophy
of Religion 23 ([988): 161-74; Cornelius Plantinga Jr, "The Threeness/
Oneness ProbJcm of the Trinity," Calvin TheQlogical JOllmal23 ([988): 37-53;
G. E. Hughes, '1'he Doctrine of the Trinity," Sophia 2 (1963): 1-12.
63 See Timothy W. Bartel, '''The Plight of the Relative Trinitarian," Religious Srudies 2413 (1988): 144, for an e)(position of the ontological problems
ariSing from the notion of God's eternally begetting Christ in the creed of
Chalcedon.
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A growing number of Christians in the traditional Protestant
camp have avoided the assertion thai the three divine persuns arc

one Being in a metaphysical sense because such assertions are
hopelessly ambiguous, unbiblical, and often incoherent when fully
fleshed oul. Instead of emphasizing a metaph ysical unity, suc h
that three bein gs are the same identical Being (a view that is de monstrably incoherent and unbiblical), they have adopted a "Social Trinity," which views the Godhead as three metaphys ica ll y
distinct persons, having three separate centers of consciousness
and will, and who are interpersonal in the fullest sense of the word
as one social unity. These Christians have adopted this view because it is more faithful to the biblical documents and logicall y
coherent (pretty strong reasons in my view).64 In addition, it
seems impossible to make sense of the fact that God the Son has
properties that the Father does not have by vinue of the in carnation if one accepts Blomberg's view of the Trinity as three beings
who are metaphy sically "the very same Being. "65 The Morm on
view of three persons as one Godhead is identical to the Social
Trinity with the exception that the indi vidual divine persons are
individuated, in addition, by having separate corporeal existence.
However, for those many Christian s in the traditional camp who
64 In addition to Cornelius PJantinga Jr., the Social Trinity has been dc·
fined and defended by C. Stephen Layman, "Trithcism and the Trinity:' Faith and
Philosophy 5/3 ( 1988): 291 - 98; Richard Swinburne, "Could There Be More
Than One God?" Faith luui Ph ilosophy 513 (1988); 225-41; and The Ch ristian
God. 170--91; David Brown. ''Trinitarian Personhood and Individuality ," in
Trinity, InCamalion. and Atonement, 48-78; Jurgcn Mollmann, The Trinity luui
tire Kingdom 0/ God: Tire Doctrine o/ God, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM,
1981); Clark H. Pinnock, F/~ of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit
(Downers Grove, Ill. : InterVa rsity, 1996), 2 1-48: and Thomas V. Morris. Our
fdea 0/ God: An In troduction to Philosophical Theolog y (Downers Grove, III .:
Inte rV arsity, 1991), 174-84.
65 See Bartel, 'The Plight of the Relative Trinitarian," 129-55. Bartel
convincingly shows that the incarnation is impossible to construe on the view
that the Father and the Son are the same Being. As Morris commented, " Kenotic
Christo logy seems to demand a view of the Trinity as consisting in three
metaphysicaJly distinct individuals severally exemplifying the attributes of
deity, a view which has come to be known as 'Social Trinitarianism' because.
according to it, there eXisl! a SOCiety of di vine persons." T~ Logic of God
Incarnate, 92. Morris defends Social Trinitarianism because it is the best way to
make coherent sense of Trinitarian claims and the incarnation. Ibid., 205-18.
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believe that Christ retains hi s resurrected body, even this distinction is not as significant as it might at first seem. Evangelicals
would do well to adopt Social Trinitarianism in light of their emphasis on biblical fidelity.
Latter-day Sai nts have been quick to emphas ize that the Father
and the Son are two distinct persons, havi ng different bodies that
are spatiall y separated. In my experience, they are not as quick to
recogn ize the indwelling unity of divine persons. Greater balance
is necessary here. The fact that the mortal or resurrected Chri st has
a body does not entail that the Father's spirit does not interpenetrate the Son and vice versa. Lauer-day Saints should not forget
that the Father and the Son are not merely bodies, but also persons
of spi rit-which spirit extends to penetrate "in" all things (see
D&C 88:6~ 1 2). Perhaps Latter-day Saints shou ld not be quite
as qui ck as Robinson to reject the notions of "co- inh erence" or
"ontological oneness" to describe this indwelling unity (p. 130).
While neither word is biblical, the concepts they intend to express
are nonetheless accepted in principle by Mormon scriptures in the
senses suggested above. Latter-day Saints affirm that the Son possesses all the essential properties of divinity possessed by the
Fat her.
Robinson reiterates that the divine persons are one in the sense
that they are one in " mind, purpose, power and intent" (p. 129).
Thi s should not be read-as Blomberg appears to d(}---to mean
that the divine persons have the type of unity that members of the
same football team can have (see p. 125). It is not enough that
they have the same purposes and intent and similar power, for
members of a football team have that kind of unity, but they certainly are not divine. Both the Mormon scriptures and the Gospel
of John repeatedly claim that the divine persons are actually " i n "
one another. Something more intimate and intense is needed to
express th is type of interpenetrating and indwelling unity. In this
sense, I agree with Blomberg that we should not reject the notion
of coinherence so long as we can reject the creedal categories and
cu ltural baggage that the word carries with it.
The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost somehow share their lives
and sp irituall y extend their presence to interpenetrate one another
and Ihereby become one "in" eac h other. The unity is so profound that the Father. Son, and Holy Ghost have the same mind in
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the sense that what one wills, the olhers also will; what one knows.
the others also know. Their unity is so complete that only one
power governs the universe rather than three, for what one di vine
person does, they all do as one. There is a single act for any stale
of affa irs brought about by the divine persons acting as one almighty agency. Thus there are distinct divine persons, but hardl y

separated or independent divine persons. In the divine life we find
no alienation, isolation. insulation, secreti veness, or aloneness. The
divine persons exist in a unity that includes lovi ng , interpenetrating. and intimate knowledge of another who is also in one 's self.
There are many divine persons, but there is only one Lord or governing power of al1. 66
Robinson's view that divin ity ari ses from unity of persons
suggests an analogy with the relation between separate atoms in a
molecule of water. Although three atoms ex ist. only one molec ule
is formed. The atoms form a synergy when united as one molecule that leads to emergent properties. The atoms are "in" one
another in the sense that they "share" electrons to form a bond.
By knowing merely the properties of hyd rogen and oxygen separately one could not begin to guess that they wou ld have the
properties of water when united as a molecu le on a new level of
ex istence. Similarly. one could hardl y begin to guess what individual s can become when united as one with the Father. The unity
of divine persons entails life on an entirely new level of existence
that is very different from this mortal life of separated and alienated existence. While it is appropriate to think of three separate
atoms on the atomic level of analysis, it is also appropriate to think
of on ly one thing. one molecule, on the molecular level. Similarly,
there is no contradiction in thinkin g of three distinct, divine persons as constituting one Godhead, just as there is no con tradic tion
in thinking of three atoms but one molecule. Further, when th e
bond of unity is severed, the e mergen t properties of water are no
longer manifest, just as when the unity of the di vine persons is set
as ide, many of the properties of divinity arc possessed potentially
but not in actuality. Analyzing divinity on the level of di vine per-

66 I have treated the Mormon view of the divine persons and the Godhead
at greater length in "Worshipworthiness and the Mormon Concept of God:' Re·
IigiQUS 5IUdies

33 ( 1997): 315- 26.
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sons addresses an entirely different level of reality than addressing
{he divine unity of the Godhead.
No risk of polytheism as such arises in Mormoni sm because
these div ine persons necessarily act, will. think. govern. and save as
one age ncy. Because the divine persons cannot exercise divine
omnipotence or omniscience when acting as separated individuals,
it logically follows that the divine power and knowledge are necessaril y exerci sed only by the divine persons acting as one agency.
one Godhead. There is therefore no risk of divided loyalties or
warring factions of so-called tribal gods because there is only one
God in the sense that there is only one Father. one sender, one
fount of di vini ty, only one God with whom all other divine pe rsons agree in purpose, power, and will in this sense of God. There
is only one divine unity, one governi ng entity. one divine family
of gods, one Godhead, only one God in this sense of God. Mormonism is not polytheistic, nor tritheistic, nor even monotheistic.
Just as all prior categories were obliterated by the experience of
Christ as Lord and Savior by the earliest Christians. so all these
pigeonholes have been shattered by the recognition that human s
have been lovi ngly invited to be one just as the Father, Son, and
Holy Ghost are one.

Mormons and Grace
Blomberg questions whether Robinso n's views regarding
grace, works, and salvation are really Mormon beliefs or merely
idiosyncracies of Robinson's peculiar belief system. While he
finds little Object ionable in Robinson's statement of grace, he
seems to suspect that Robinson is a closet evangelical and that
Latter-day Saints are really co mmitted to salvation by works (see
p. 182). However, I enthu siastically endorse Robinson's statement
of grace and salvat ion as a view not merely compatible with Mormon scriptures. but required by them . Some years ago I published
a study of the notion(s) of grace in the history of Christian
thought and in Mormonism. 67 The conclusions I reached regard ing grace in Mormon th ought (and in Paul) are remarkabl y
67 Blake T. Ostler. 'The Concept of Grace in Christian Thought." Dkl{ogue 23/4 (1990): 13-43; and 'The Development of the Mormon Concept of
Grace," Dia/ogue 24/1 (199\): 57-84.
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similar to those that Robinson teaches. We both concluded thai for
Latter·day Saints being justified means to enter into a .wving
covenant relationship with Christ Jesus through grace. No conditions are required 10 enter the covenant relmionship because it is
offered in unconditional love-il is a sheer, unmerited gift. Christ

already loves us. However, once in the relationship. one must
abide by covenant conditions to remain faithful to the relationship
(see pp. 145--46).68 I will give three different expressions of how
we should conceive of God's grace in both the Bible and Mormon
scriptures in general.
I. The Johannine Model of Grace. John teaches that "we
love [God] because he first loved us" ( I John 4:19). God's un conditional love precedes our response; he has already accepted
us. We accept God's unconditional offer of love, of sav ing grace,
by reciprocating love. If we accept God, we love him, and if we
love him, we "keep his commandments" (John 14:2 1-23; 2 John
2:6). If we keep God's commandments. then we "abide in {his]
love" (John 15:10-11; I John 3:22_24).69 We "know" God
(interpersonally) if we keep his commandments (I John 2:3). To
" know" (he only true Ood. and Jesus Christ whom he sent, is life
eternal (see John 17:3). If we keep the commandments, then "t he
love of God [isl perfected" in us and "we fknowJ that we are in
him" (l John 2:5). The love of God transforms us into "sons of
God," and when he appears "we shall be like him; for we shall
see him as he is" (I John 3:2) because this hope purifies us as He
is pure (see I John 3:3).
The lohannine expression of grace and salvation focuses on
the unconditional divine love that we accept by reciprocating love.
However. conditions to "abide in" the relationship require keep68 According to Robinson: ''The LOS concept of being 'in Christ' (paul's
term) or being 'perfect in Christ' (Moroni's term) is one of covenant relationship. While there are no preconditions for entering into the covenant of faith in
Christ to be justified by his grace through faith. there arc covenant obligations
incurred by so entering. Those who have been justified by faith are obliged to
serve Christ and to make him their Lord by imitating him in their behavior and
keepinl his commandments" (pp. 145-46).
6
For a good discussion of the themes of grace and salvation in the Gospel of John, see Grant R. Osborne. "Soleriology in the <klspel of John," in The
Grace of God, the Will of Man ; A Case for Armini(Jnism, cd. Clark H. Pinnock
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1989),243-60.
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ing the commandments. Bl omberg is unco mfortable with the ta lk
by Robin son and Latte r-day Saints in general about keeping the
commandments rat her than re lying on grace alone to complete a
once-and-for-all salvat ion already fully accompli shed at the m o~
ment of conversion or accepting Christ (see pp. 178-80) . How~
ever, neithe r Robin son nor the Latte r-day Saints in vented this emphasis o n keep in g the commandments as a condition fo r abid ing
in God's love. It is a part of the Johannine ex pression of grace.
2. The Pauline Model oj Grace. No cont radiction between
unconditional grace and conditio nal perseverance exists in the
covenant re latio nship. For example, I love my wife unco ndition ·
ally, but that does not imply that there are no conditions necessary
to maintain my marriage covenant s and remain faithful to he r.
The meaning of Jai th (Greek pistis, Hebrew Jemiilliih ) in Paul is
simi lar to this " fait hful " in terpersona l commitme nt between hu sband and wife of unconditi ona l love and faithfuln ess to covenants.
Pau l expressed entrance into the covenant relationship by th e
terms justification or to justify (dikaioo and dikaiosyne), which are
very difficull to trans late but essentiall y mean to enter into a
proper re lati onsh ip and through the re lations hi p to be " ri g ht wised" or to be made right. Justifi cation for Paul al most always
mcant to e nter inlo a pro per re lationshi p with God the Father
through the savi ng acti on of Ch rist Jesus.70 Just as Israe l had been
electcd to the covenant relationship with Yahweh wit hout regard to
whether Israe l deserved suc h a relationship, so the covenant re lationship was now offered to Christians with out any cond it ions.
The cove nant re lat ionship was therefore offe red as a grace, an
unmerited gi ft , that cou ld not be earned by works. The on ly co ndition to enterin g the relationsh ip was faith in Jesus (see Roman s
5; 1- 2; 1 ];6).
However, once "i n" (he relat ionshi p, o nce li ving " in " Christ,
once justified, one wa<; under obli gation to keep the " law of the
spirit of life in Christ" (Ro mans 8:2), o r "the law of C hri st"
(Ga latians 6:2), or Christ' s law (sec I Corinthians 9:21), o r the
" la w of faith" (Romans 3:27). The law of Moses had been replaced by the law of love given by Jesus in the Sermon on the
Mount , which summarized the Torah in a si ngle co mmand (see
70 Ostler, "The Concept of Grace in Christian Thought." 14-17.
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Ja mes 2:8). T he on ly fai th that justified was " fa ith which worketh
by lovc" (Galatians 5:6, \3). Both Robinson and Blomberg agree
that works natura lly follow from accept ing grace and fa ith . However, in my view it is inaccurate 10 assert that works " fo ll ow" fa ith
or grace, as if works arc a mere afterthought that play no ro le in
our salvation. As James exp lained, faith without works is dead (sec
James 2:17). A disti nction between fa ith and works is a false dic hotomy- like a body without a spiri t (sec James 2:26). Acceptance of C hrist is to love hi m. and to love him is to keep his commandme nts. As James put ii , " faith works together with (synergei)
deeds a nd by works fai th was made complete and fulfi lled (pist is
Jyne rgei lo;s ergois ka; ek ton erKon hi! pistil" eleleiothe kai
epierorhej" (James 2:22 , aut hor's translat io n). To have fa it h is to
be fa ithful. Entra nce inlo the divine relationship as a sheer grace
by fa ith mu st lead to perseverance in grace and sancti fica ti on
thro ug h grace by con tinued fai thful ness to God ' s commands.
Finally, Blomberg appears to ack now ledge a contradiction
bctwecn be ing saved by grace and bei ng judged by works. In
Blomberg's view, once one is just ified by grace one enlers into a
" process of moral transformation ... that inel'itably leads to perseverance in good works . .. llhat are] never adeq uate to merit
eterna l li fe with God in and of themselves" (p. 169, emphasis
added). The re may be a judgme nt accord ing to works, but on ly
"t he lost will be j udged on the bas is of works, not by grace"
(p. 174). However, those who have been "saved" by grace have
a " full y completed salvation by grace thro ug h fai th a lo ne"
(p. 180). T hus judg ment by works is only fo r those who are losl
according to Blomberg's view.
This seems wrong to me. It is important not (0 rcad into Paul
the contradiction between works and grace secn by Augustine,
Luther, and Calvin, as Blomberg seems to do. As E. P. Sanders has
convinc ingly demonstrated, Paul did not perceive a tensio n between be ing saved by grace and being judged by works .71 In par71 E. P. Sanders, Paul wuf Pales/iniall Judaism : A Comparisan of Par/em s
1977),516-18. The Latter-day Saint view is

of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress.

supported by the "new perspectivc" on Paul or "covenantal nomi s m."·
In this view ooe enters the covenant relationship or is justified by grace. but
obedicnce to the terms of the covenant is thereafter demanded to remain in the
relationship. Sce D. B. Garlington. "The Obedience of Faith in the Leltcr to th e
~ tro ng t y
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ticular, Paul recognized that persons could "fall from grace" if
they rejected Chri st by conduct inconsistent with the law of loveconduct injurious to the covenant relationsh ip-such as murder.
fornica ti on, or sodomy (see Galatians 5:5-6, 19- 21). Though the
covenant re lation ship is entered (i.e. , persons are justified) b y
grace through faith in Chri st, all persons nevertheless will be
judged according to their works and receive according to their
deeds (see I Corinthians 3: 12- 15; 2 Corin thians 5:8-10; Romans
2:6-7). "For we must all appear before the judgment seat of
Christ" to receive the things done in this life (2 Corinthians 5:10.
e mphasis added); God will "rende r to every man according to his
deeds" (Romans 2:6). Even if one accepts Christ. one can fall
from grace and be "led away with the error of the wicked"
(2 Peter 3: 17- 18). Thus it is not inevitable, if one is once "i n
Chri st," that one is saved once-and-for-a ll . Grace does not "i nevitably" lead to perseverance in good works. Accord in g to Paul,
onl y Ihose who endure "i n grace," or " in the Spirit," or " I n
Rom:lns PMt II : The Obedience of Faith and Judgment by Works," Westminster
Tlreologiclll Joumal53 (spring (991): 73-91; J. D. G. Dunn. "lne New Per·
spective on Paul." 1l!llIelill of lire JollIZ R)'/mras Uhrary 65 (1983): 95- 122.
As D.B. Garlington noted in his excellent article on the re lation between
present justification by grace and ultimate judgment by works: ''The problem
is the presence of biblical- particularly NT-passages which ground es·
chatological justification ill tlte works of tlte indil'idual. We think for instance
of lesus' warning to the Pharisees: '1 tell you, on the day of judgment men will
render account of every careless word they uller; for by tileir words YOII will be
jllstified, and by )'our words YOII will be condemned' (Matt. 12:36-37). All the
morc striking because o r its author is the pronouncement of Rom. 2:13: 'For it is
not tbc hcarcrs of the law who arc righteous before God, but the doers of the law
who will be justified.' And of course, the re is James' insistence that justi fication
is by works and not by fait h a lone (2:24). Even in passages where 'justification'
as such is not men tioned. the same perspective is evident. e.g., 2 Cor. 5:10: 'For
we must all appear before the judgmcnt scat of Christ. so thm each one may be
repa id according to what he has done in the body.'" Garlington, ''The Obedience
of Faitb:' 73. Garli ngton argues persuasively that the apparent paradox arising
from present justification by grace and judgmcnt by works is not a contrad iction:
'The question then is how the NT and particularly Paul can make what appears to
be a quantum leap from present justification by fai th alone to future justificatio n,
which entails an assessment of onc's lifc 'in the body.'" Ibid. Because Paul
taught thm persons arc accepted into the covenant relationship through grace.
but must be obedicnt \0 the tcrms and stipu lat ions of the covenant to persevere
the re in . judg ment by works follows from Paul's doctrine of grace.
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C hrist,"-t hat is, only those who belong to Christ on Ihe Day o f
the Lord (i.e .• the day of judgment)- will be saved (see 1 Thessalonians 5:23; I Corinthians 1:8; 16:3; 2 Corinthians 11 :3; Phil ippians 1:27 ; 2: 15; Galatians 6:9) .
For Paul , the fin al result of remaining "in grace" is apo theosis. Christ became human so thaI we could become as Ch rist: "Fa r
ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Ch rist. thai, though he was
rich, yet for you r sakes he became poor, Ihat ye thro ugh his pove rty might be rich" (2 Corin thians 8:9), "For he hath made him
to be sin fo r us, who knew no sin ; thai we might be made th e
ri ghteousness of God" (2 Corinlhi ans 5:2 1). As A. N. Williams
ex plains:
What is human dest iny? To become God. That. at
least. was the belief of the earliest Christians. Such an
unde rstanding is evident in the letters of SI. Paul (Rom .
8: II ; 1 Cor. 15:49; and 2 Cor. 8:9) and the first Chris·
tians found it in the pages of the Hebrew Bible (Ps.
82:6. quoted in John 10:34). Above all . the nasce nt
theologica l trad ition poi nted to 2 Peter I :4: "Th us has
he given us. th rough these things, hi s precious and very
great promises, so that through them you may escape
fro m corrupt ion that is in the world because of him,
and may become part icipants in divi ne nat ure." As the
tradi tion renected on these texts, de ification became the
dominant model of salvation and sanct ificat ion in
the patri stic peri od, from Ignatius of Antioc h to J ohn
Damascene, in the We.<;t (in the writings of Tertulli an
and Augustine) as we ll as in the East.72
72 A. N. Williams, "Deification in the Summa Theologiae: A StructU nlJ Interpretation of the PrinuJ Pars," The Thomist 6112 (1997): 219. On page 221.
Wi lliams notes: "Because God alone gives grace. the assertion that the human
I'Crson becomes divine by grace rather than by nature effecti vely reinforces the
ontological divide between Uncreated and created, The distinction between
creature and Creator can be parsed as the d ifference between the One who voluntari ly and generously shares his life, and those who can only be recipie nts of
that life. By grace the dei fied indeed share in divine nature, but they never
the mselves become Dcifiers," Latter-day Saints can accept this distinction
between Creator and created, for God is the source of our life and, by grace. of
de ification. LaUer-day Saints believe thaI the God head is the source of grace and
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3. The Latter-day Sailll Model of Grace, Although the earliest state ments of grace and salvation in Mormon sc ripture rely o n
Paul 's categories of justification and sanctification (see D&C
20:30- 34), Mormoni sm adopted a more dyna mi c view of grace
based on John 's metaphor of growth in the light of Christ. Paul's
view of grace assumed a state of bei ng-beillg justified, beillg
sanctified, beillg "i n Christ," being " in grace," and so forth, In
contmst, the Mormon scriptures view grace as a process of grow th
in Chri st's light. Christ is the light who gives himself to every person (see D&C 88:5-7; 93:2, 9). Thi s light is equated with God's
own govern ing spirit, power, and knowledge (see D&C 88:7,
I 1- 13), The ligh t of Christ redee ms the human will so that persons are free to accept or rejeci the li ght, having a knowledge of
good and ev il (see D&C 93:31-32, 38-39). A person freely enters
the sav ing relationship wilh God by receiving this divine li ghl :
" he Ihal receiveth light, and co ntinueth in God, recei veth more
light ; and thai light groweth brighter and brighter until the perfect
day" (D&C 50:24), The offer of light is a sheer gift, an unmerited grace, which can be freely accepted through faith , Everyone
wi ll receive freely precisely thai degree of joy and li ght that he or
she is willing to accept:

And they who rema in shall also be qu ickened; nevert heless, they shall return again to their own place, 10
e nj oy that which Ihey are willing 10 receive, because
deification through gracc; howcvcr. no scripture suppons the view that humans
can become the source of deifica tion for others. Although. strictly speaking, al l
Christians who havc spokcn of deification from thc Patristic period to thc
Restoration differ from Mormons in insisting on an ontological divide bctwecn
God and humans, nevertheless. Lallcr-day Saints can aeccpt the d istinct ion
between God as the giver and humans as the receivcrs of grace by wh ich they can
be dc ified. Mormon scripture docs not support the view that humans become
deified by natu rc. For excel lent discussio ns of thc relation between the doctrines
of grace, justification, and apotheosis of humans, sec a lso William G. Rusch,
" Uow the Eastern Fathers Understood What the Western Chureh Meant by
Justification," ill Justification by Fai/h: Lwheran$ lUUJ emholies in Dialogue
VlI. cd. H. George Anderson, T. Austin Murphy. and Joseph A. Burgess
(M inneapolis: Augsburg, 1985). 131-42; Jules Gross, w divillisa/iQlI dl/ chrelien d't/pres les

p~res

grec.r: COnlribu/ion lris/orique a kl doc/rille de III griice

(Paris: Gabalda. 1938): Di,:fiollnaire de spirilualili, asci/iqlle el m)'stique,
lJOCfrine ellrislOire (PariS: Beauchesne. 1937-), 5,V. "divinisation."
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they were not wi lling to enjoy thai which they m ight
have received. For what dOlh it profi t a man if a g ift is
bestowed upon him, and he receive n OI the gift ? Beho ld. he rejo ices n OI in that which is given un to him,
neithe r rejoices in him who is the g iver of the gift.

(D&C 88:32-3 3)
Persons must grow fro m "grace to grace" until they "rece ive
a fu lness" (D&C 93:20, 27), Once havi ng en tered the re lat ions hip
by accepting the light free ly offered by God as a gift, a person
grows in the lig ht by keepi ng the command ments " unt il he is g lorif ied in truth and knowet h all t hings" (D&C 93:28), We wi ll be
qu ickened, or made al ive in Christ, by that degree of light Ihal we
freely accept as a gift (see D&C 76; 88:28), Moreover. all receive
the lig ht in varying degrees and are saved except a smal l group
who openly reject Christ and descend in to t he depth of dark ness
(see D&C 76:43). The ultimate goal is 10 be one with God. for one
who receives a fu lness of light is one in the Father and the Son j ust
as they are one in each other (see D&C 93:20). Those who receive
a fulness of hi s glory are "gods. even the sons of God" (D&C
76:58), "These are they who are ... made pe rfect t hroug h Jesus
the mediato r of the new covenant, who wrought OU I Ihis perfect
atone me nt through the s hedding of his own blood" (D&C
76:69). Th us the result of the gracious al-one-ment perfect ly ac cepted by faithfu lness is to be at-one "in" God.
Sanctifi cation is thus distinct from justificat io n, which refers 10
the in iti al experie nce of conversion, to entering the saving re lationship by grace through faith. Just ifica tion is God's ex tern a l
declaratio n that we are in a state of being described as " n ot
gui lty." that he accepts us uncond it io nall y as we accept his love
by exercising fait h in Christ. In contrast, "sanctification" refers to
the internal process of restoring or renew ing the Christ ian t hroug h
d ivine grace, of growing in the relationshi p with God, o f being
made conformed to the image of God, of being made over in
Christ's image through works of 10ve. 73 As Doctrine and Cove73 The Reformers adopted a systematic and deliberate distinction between
justi fication and sanctification. By justification they understood an extrinsic
declaration that the Christian is rightcous, involving a change in Sla lUS before
God rather than a change in n(l/I/re. and by sunc\ific:ltion they understood the
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nants 20:31 clearly declares: "We know also, that sanctification
through the grace of our Lord and Savior Jesus Chri st is just and
true, to all those who love and serve God with all their mights,
minds, and strength ," Whereas we enter the relationship by God's
grace through our faith , we become one with God through
Chri st's gracious at·one-ment and the pu rg ing of sin from us by
the Holy Ghost through our reciprocating love, The clearest
statement of sanctification by grace in Latter-day Saint scri pt ure is
Moroni 10:32- 33 .74 In Mormon thought, one finds no "c heap
grace," for the only person who can claim to be saved by grace is
the person who gives everything to God- heart, mi ght, mind, and
stren gth . Sanct ification consists in participation in the divine nature, to be holy as God is holy (see Lev iticus 19:2; and 1 Peter
I : 15- 16).

This view of grace is well suited to the Mormon view of salva·
tion as an ongo ing process of "eternal progression" and apotheosis or deification of human s by grace. Yet it is essentially th e
same view of grace and salvation as the Johannine and Pauline
views: we enter into the sav ing relationship by grace, in unconditionallove, and we remain in, abide in. grow in the relati onship b y
faithfulness to God's commandments . The light of Christ is more
than a metaphor; il is an actual description of the quality and
closeness of our relati onship wilh God, which varies for every pe rson according to the grace he or she is willing to accept.
However, it must be emphasized that the freedom to accept the
gift of light , to exercise faith, to enter the relationship, to be just i·
fied, is a gift made possible only by the atonement (see D&C
93:38-39). In Mormon scripture, all persons would be forever cut
off from God's presence (see Alma 42:7), would be in a state
process by which God renews or restores the justi fi ed sinner. See McGrath, Iusli·
lia Dei, I: 182.
74 ··Yea.eome unto Christ, and be perfected in him. and de ny yourselves
of all ungodliness; and if ye shall deny yourselves of all ungodliness, and love
God with all your might. mind and strength, then is his gmce sufficient for you,
that by his grace ye may be perfect in Christ; and if by the grace of God ye are
perfect in Christ, ye can in nowise deny the power of God. And again, if yc by
the grace of God are perfect in Christ. and dcny not his power. then are ye sanc ti ·
fied in Christ by the grace of God, th rough the shedding of the blood of Christ,
which is in the covenant of the Father unto the rem ission or your sins, thai ye
become holy. without spot" (Moroni 10:32-33).
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contrary to God and naturally evil (see Mos iah 3: 19; Al ma 41 : 1 I ;
42: 10), would be capti ve 10 the devil (see 2 Nephi 9:8-9), a nd
would not be free to choose good (see Mosiah 16:3)-they
"would be," that is, except for the atonemenl. 75 However, because of C hrist's atone ment, all persons are made free to act fo r
themselves and not merely to be acted upon (see 2 Nephi
2:26-27). Because of the atonement , all persons will relUm to
God's presence to be judged according to their works (see Alma
42:23; 2 Nephi 9: 13- 16; Alma 41:3-4; 42:23). Because of the
atonement, little chil dren arc made whole and are not capab le of
co mmittin g sin (see Moroni 8:8, 12). According to Latter-day
Saints, Chri st' s grace offered through the atonement is the neces·
sary and sufficie nt cond ition for human agency . As such, it is ul·
timately "by grace that we are saved, fevenJ afl er all we can d o,"
fo r it is only by grace that we are able to act for ourselves to e nte r
in to the sav in g relat ionship (2 Neph i 25: 23).
Thus Mormonism has a notion of prevenien t grace, although
it differs sign ificantly fro m the Calvin ist view of preven ient grace.
"Prevenient grace" is that grace given to huma ns before any act
of human agency or fa ith. For Calvinists, God 's prevenient grace
moves the human will to accept God's effi cacious grace. Acco rd ·
ing to Calvin, persons can accept the sav ing grace only because
God has predesti ned them to salvation and causa ll y determined
their will to accept efficac ious grace through hi s prevenie nt grace.
Moreover, God's prevenie nt grace is irresistible-it cannot be re·
jected by an ev il will. Those who do not accept God 's efficac ious
grace, or grace that accomplishes their salvati on, fa il to do so be cause God has decided in his arbitrary election to leave them to
damnation. That is, in the Calvinist view God has decided not to
grant irresist ible prevenient grace to some and thu s has dec ided to
abandon them to damn ati on.76
7S Laller-day Saints th us do not accept the traditional view of original s i n
for which pcrson ~ are either gUilty of Adam's sin (Calvin's view) or inevitahly
led to sin by their evil nature (Amhrose's view); rat her. Mormons believe i n
"hypothetical original sin." We would be utterly lost and evil but for the alonement. Because of the atonement, we are made free to choose for ourselves. However. if we reject the atonement by fail ing to keep the commandments. then we
"retu rn" to our evil nature. See my "Mormon Concept of Grace," 60-62.
76 See Ostler. ''Thc Concept of Grace in Christian Thought." 33-38.
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Thi s co nce pt of prevenient grace makes God an arbitrary and
evi l tyrant. He could save all persons, but he has decided not to.
This is not the God of love taught by Jesus. This view of grace
makes God unju st, unfair, unloving, and loathsome . Blomberg
adopts a notion of salvation by grace alont! (by which he apparently means that human will has no role in sal vation) ;77 God's
elect ion alone ex plain s who is saved and who is damned (see
p. 185 ).78 Blomberg responds 10 the argument that (at least this
view 00 grace is unfair in the same way as did Augustine, Aqui nas, Calvin, and Luther: "We should lIot want God to be fa ir " because we all fall so short of God's holy standard that we cannot
hope to make it on our own (see p. 185). Accord ing to Calvinists.
because of si n all persons (incl udin g little children ) "deserve
eternal death" (p. 17 1). But this response is a dodge; it evades the
central issue: if God can save everyone, and he des ires to save
everyone out of love, then why has he decided 10 leave some persons to damnation? It just won' t do to observe that we all deserve
to be damned, so we should be grate ful that God has dec ided to
save some of us. What would we think of a parent who could pull
both her children safely from a burnin g car, but decides arbitrarily to save one and not the ot her?79 We should be morall y ou t-

77 [n fa irness. B[omberg docs no t say that the will has no role in sa lvation. I ha ve inferred that this is his position from his insistence on ··graee
alone" and what he says abou t Robinson·s analogy of the bicycle. He rejects any
human input into the reception of gruce (see pp . 180- 81). If I have misinterpreted Blomberg on this point then I apologize in advance and look rorward to
being corrected. However, I am sti ll glad to be able to present (albeit very
brieO.n a few reasons for rejecting Calv inism.
For a good discussion of some of the proble ms of a Calvinist view o f
grace. see lack. W. Cottrel l. 'The Nature of the Divine Sovereignty," in The
Grace of God, Ihe Will o/ Mall, 97-11 9: and Bruce Reichenbach. "God Li mits His
Power," in Predeslinalion and Free Will, 99-124.
79 Of course. Calvinists and others who adopi the notion of irres ist ible
grace are nO! wi thout recourse to respond to these types of problems with their
theology. The most common move is to deny that God owes the types of duties
to his creatu res that monal parents owe to their children. Sec Allister E.
McGrath, Iuslilia Dei: A HiS/Dry of llle ChriSlian DoC/rine of Juslifica/ion. from
J500 10 Ihe Presenl (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press. 1986), 47-52.
However, one pays a high price fo r this approach, ror if God's moral duties (ir
any) are radically different from ours. then we lose all conception of what good
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raged. We should be even more outraged if we learn Ihat the parent's decision is based on the judgment that the ch ild who burned
deserved it because the child supposedl y was guilty for sins of an
ancient anccstor--even though she was only three years old! Of
course, the child who was saved deserved sal vation or damnatio n
equall y, so this supposed justifi cation is not the reason for salvalion or damnation al all-the decision is purely arbitrary and capricious. I cannot worship such a "god." I wouldn't even want to
spend the weekend with such a person-let alone an eternity.
Fortunately. this admittedly "un fair" view of grace is n OI the
only option. God has give n all persons sufficient grace for their
salvation; whether they are saved is dependent on their choice to
make Ch ri st their Lord and to persevere "in Chri st" by keeping
the com mandments, or to rej ect the light that is offered. Christ's
atonement is not limited to benefit only the elect few; it is universal in scope and infinite in effect. Moreover, the dec ision to accept
the atonement or to reject it, to grow in light or to descend into
darkness. is one that mu st be made in every mome nt of human
existence rather than just one time at conversion, once-and-for-all.
Thus God is nO( unfair in his judgments and disc riminatory in hi s
love. The Latter-day Saint notion of " preveni ent grace" makes
grace the found at ion for human moral agency rather than its
complete negation. Rather than irresistibly "mov in g" the will to
initiate faith to accept grace, as in Calvinist thought, in Mormon
thought God's grace restores the otherwi se paralyzed will to respond in love to God's loving overtures of salvation. Before any
dec ision or action on our part, God has graciously restored our
wi ll so that we can decide to accept or reject the li ght he offers.
Thi s is a view of grace that is not only scriptural , but, as Joseph
Sm ith might have said , it tastes good.

Conclusion
I hi ghl y recommend How Wide the Divide? as a model of
Christian dialogue. We are the beneficiaries of the intelligent,
charitab le, and engaging discussion of two persons who are exemplary representatives of their respecti ve fa iths. It is obvious that I
means when applicd to God. Moreovcr, what sense docs it make 10 call God
"f(lthcr" if he is nothing like a human pnrcnt?
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disagree at po ints with both Blomberg and Ro binson. That is to be
expected . However, 1 want to e mphasize that we agree on mu ch
more and have much in common. I hope my commen ts do not
detract from th at ce ntral fact. I hope that the di vide has been
bridged to the extent that further dialogue can take place. I have
learned a great deal from evangelical writers. both Reformed and
Arminian . They have a ri ch and valuable heritage rrom which
Latter-day Saints have muc h to gain. I o nl y hope that they can
reciprocate and fin d the value that I believe can be gained fr o m
Mormonism.
One final note: As Christians, both evange licals and Mormons
accept Jesus' new commandment to love one another. We show
our love best by listening with the Spirit and speakin g with mutual
respect. That is what both Blom berg and Robin son acco mpli shed
without compromising the ir faith. It is a simple message. It is hard
to learn. But we can do it.

